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CLEAN ENERGY EQUITY
Felix Mormann*
Abstract
Solar, wind, and other clean, renewable sources of energy promise to
mitigate climate change, enhance energy security, and foster economic
growth. But many of the policies in place to promote clean energy today
are marred by an uneven distribution of economic opportunities and
associated financial burdens. Tax incentives for renewables cost
American taxpayers billions of dollars every year, yet the tax code
effectively precludes all but the largest banks and most profitable
corporations from reaping the benefits of these tax breaks. Other policies,
such as renewable portfolio standards that set minimum quota to create
demand for renewable electricity require such high levels of market
expertise and financial acumen that they engender similarly disparate
social impacts—all in the name of an environmentally sustainable energy
future.
To date, policymakers and scholars have focused primarily on the
efficacy and, more recently, the efficiency of clean energy policy. This
Article makes the case that the next generation of policies should
incorporate equity as another first-order consideration in policy design
and implementation. Properly defined as the commensurate matching of
costs and benefits, equity offers a more reliable metric for distributional
impacts than the multitude of competing, normatively charged notions of
fairness that currently dominate the public discourse.
Empirical assessment and qualitative analysis of today’s leading
clean energy policies reveal widespread issues related to equity. Insights
gleaned from a representative sampling of the global policy potpourri
yield valuable design recommendations for the next generation of clean
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energy policies—a generation that, ideally, will be at once effective,
efficient, and more equitable.
As the greening grid becomes ever more interactive, so, too, should
the process that produces the policy landscape driving the clean energy
transition become more participatory. This Article suggests Elinor
Ostrom’s polycentricity model as a powerful governance tool to help
produce more equitable clean energy policies.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 336
I. THE CASE FOR EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS IN CLEAN ENERGY POLICY ........... 342
A. Equity’s Historic Role in Energy Law ...................................................... 343
B. Policy Equity Before Outcome Equity ...................................................... 344
C. The Proper Role for Equity in Clean Energy Policy ................................. 346
II. CLEAN ENERGY POLICY TODAY: AN OVERVIEW.......................................... 348
A. Feed-in Tariffs ......................................................................................... 349
B. Tender Regimes ....................................................................................... 351
C. Net Energy Metering Programs ............................................................... 352
D. Tax Credits ............................................................................................. 352
E. Renewable Portfolio Standards ................................................................ 353
III. ASSESSING THE EQUITY OF TODAY’S CLEAN ENERGY POLICIES ................. 354
A. Feed-in Tariffs – Case Study Germany ..................................................... 356
B. Tender Regimes – Case Study Ireland ...................................................... 359
C. Net Energy Metering – Case Study United States ..................................... 362
D. Tax Credits – Case Study United States ................................................... 366
E. Renewable Portfolio Standards – Case Study United States...................... 370
F. Summary and Suggestions for Reform ...................................................... 373
IV. POLYCENTRICITY AS A CATALYST FOR GREATER POLICY EQUITY .............. 376
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 381
INTRODUCTION
Anthropogenic climate change has made the transition to a clean, low-carbon
energy economy, or decarbonization,1 a top priority for policymakers around the
world.2 At the end of 2017, nearly 180 countries across the globe had set targets and
1

Deep decarbonization is commonly defined as “steep reductions in energy-related
CO2 emissions through a transformation of energy systems.” See, e.g., J.H. WILLIAMS ET
AL., ENERGEY AND ENVTL. ECON., INC., PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE
UNITED STATES iii (2014), http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/US-DeepDecarbonization-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JEW-2EQ6].
2
See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 1102–09 (2013) (discussing the abrupt and perhaps
irreversible impact and projections of climate changes along with a number of temperature
thresholds with 2 degrees Celsius being the most prominent target); see also
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implemented policies to support the build-out of renewable energy infrastructure3—
a more than tenfold increase compared to the fifteen countries reported for 2005.4
Along the way, the share of low-carbon, climate-friendly renewables in the global
power mix has grown to over 26 percent.5 The first generation of clean energy
policies deserves great credit for moving solar, wind, and other renewable energy
technologies out of the lab and into the marketplace. As these technologies mature
and their market share continues to grow, however, their enabling policy landscape
requires rethinking.
To date, policymakers have focused primarily on the efficacy and, more
recently, the efficiency of their policy commitment to renewables. Starting in the
1990s, clean energy policies sought to get as much steel in the ground (and solar
panels on rooftops) as possible with little, if any, concern for the costs involved.6
Since the late 2000s, as solar, wind, and other renewables graduated from niche
markets and entered the mainstream, clean energy policies have been crafted with a
growing concern for their cost efficiency in order to mitigate the financial burden on
ratepayers and taxpayers.7 Nearly three decades of efficacy- and, more recently,
efficiency-oriented policymaking have produced considerable environmental and
economic benefits.8 Figure 1 illustrates the historic evolution of clean energy
policymaking.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND
CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 6–26 (2011) (discussing the opportunities and challenges
associated with the ramp-up of low-carbon, renewable energy technologies) [hereinafter
IPCC, RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES].
3
JANET L. SAWIN ET AL., RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY NETWORK FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY, RENEWABLES 2018 GLOBAL STATUS REPORT 49 (Lisa Mastny et al. eds., 2018)
[hereinafter REN21 2018].
4
JANET L. SAWIN ET AL., RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY NETWORK FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY, RENEWABLES 2015 GLOBAL STATUS REPORT 87 (Lisa Mastny ed., 2015)
[hereinafter REN21 2015].
5
REN21 2018, supra note 3 at 41.
6
See, e.g., INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, FULL COST RATES (2017),
https://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/renewableenergy/ [https://perma.cc/8EJ2-6323]
(using advanced search, select “Germany” under “Countries” subheading, click search; then
type “Full Cost Rates” into the “Filter:” bar) (describing Germany’s 1993 “Full Cost Rates”
program, which offers to cover the full cost of solar photovoltaic installations).
7
See, e.g., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123
Stat. 115 (establishing the U.S. “Cash Grant” program to remedy renewable energy project
financing inefficiencies flowing from the 2008/09 financial crisis); see also Lincoln L.
Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-in Tariffs in Turmoil, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 937, 956–58 (2014)
(describing repeated adjustments to the German feed-in tariff in order to prevent costs from
getting out of hand).
8
See, e.g., Kyle Siler-Evans et al., Regional Variations in the Health, Environmental,
and Climate Benefits of Wind and Solar Generation, 110 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCIS.
11768 (2013) (exploring the diverse environmental benefits of renewable energy); Felix
Mormann et al., A Tale of Three Markets: Comparing the Renewable Energy Experiences of
California, Texas, and Germany, 35 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 74 (2016) (discussing the job
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Figure 1: Historical Evolution of Clean Energy Policymaking

The prevailing focus on efficacy and efficiency, however, has led other policy
considerations, such as equity, to go largely overlooked. As renewables gain evergreater traction in the global energy economy, the social impacts of these
technologies and the policies that support them are becoming more and more salient.
Today’s crop of clean energy policies creates winners and losers not only across
competing technologies9 but also among ratepayers, taxpayers, and other
stakeholders. Federal tax incentives for renewables, for example, cost American
taxpayers billions of dollars every year, yet the tax code effectively precludes all but
the largest banks and most profitable corporations from reaping the benefits of these
tax breaks.10 In much the same vein, renewable portfolio standards require
ratepayers to finance markets and demand for renewable electricity but require such
high levels of market expertise and financial acumen that they prove similarly
exclusive.11
This disconnect between the allocation of costs and access to the economic
benefits created by clean energy policy suggests that policymakers prioritize
environmental and economic outcomes at the expense of equity and social

creation benefits associated with renewable energy deployment in California, Texas, and
Germany).
9
See, e.g., Zachary Liscow & Quentin Karpilow, Innovation Snowballing and Climate
Law, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 387 (2017) (describing the well-established narrative of public
policy support for renewable energy technologies picking winners and losers).
10
See infra Section III.D.
11
See infra Section III.E.
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sustainability.12 The resulting disparate social impacts threaten to erode popular
support for a key component of global efforts to mitigate anthropogenic climate
change.13 The sudden rollback of Spain’s renewable energy support regime offers
an illustrative example of these dynamics.14 When Spanish regulators naively chose
to offer local solar generators rates similar to those of Germany’s then widely praised
feed-in tariff, these rates proved overly generous given Spain’s 60% greater
insolation compared to Germany. The resulting windfall profits for developers and
the hefty financial burden they imposed on Spanish voters caused public support for
renewables to dwindle and, ultimately, led to the policy’s unraveling.
A sizeable body of literature has examined the efficacy of policies to promote
clean energy around the globe.15 More recent scholarship has explored the cost
efficiency of policies to promote the large-scale deployment of solar, wind, and other
renewables. 16 The scholarly community is only just beginning, however, to explore
the social challenges posed by the transition to a low-carbon, renewables-based

12

For a discussion of the complex relationships among environmental, economic, and
social sustainability, see Felix Mormann, Can Clean Energy Policy Promote Environmental,
Economic, and Social Sustainability?, 33 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 343 (2018).
13
See Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement,
U.N. DOC. FCC/CP/2015/L.9 (Dec. 12, 2015), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21
/eng/l09r01.pdf [https://perma.cc/DS9K-M28X]. The Paris agreement entered into force on
November 4, 2016, less than a year after its adoption, following ratification by 55 states
accounting for at least 55% of global greenhouse gas emissions, including the United States.
See Paris Accord—Status of Ratification, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification [https://perma.
cc/5VEF-A8W9].
14
See Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621, 1661–62
(2015) [hereinafter Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism] (discussing the equity issues
prompting the sudden suspension of Spain’s policy incentives for solar facilities).
15
The International Energy Agency has done foundational work in this space, exploring
the relative efficacy of renewable energy policies in the OECD and BRIC countries using
country-specific “effectiveness indicators” based on each country’s renewable energy
potiential. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, DEPLOYING RENEWABLES—BEST AND FUTURE
POLICY PRACTICE (2011) [hereinafter IEA 2011]; INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, DEPLOYING
RENEWABLES—PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE POLICIES (2008) [hereinafter IEA 2008]. See
generally Gireesh Shrimali et al., Wind Energy Deployment in the U.S.: An Empirical
Analysis of the Role of Federal and State Policies, 43 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY
R. 796 (2015); Lucy Butler & Karsten Neuhoff, Comparison of Feed-in Tariff, Quota and
Auction Mechanisms to Support Wind Power Development, 33 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1854
(2008). See generally Fredric C. Menz, Green Electricity Policies in the United States: Case
Study, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 2398 (2005).
16
This stream of research has sought to assess how much bang a policy delivers, in
renewable energy capacity deployed, for the ratepayers’ or taxpayers’ buck. See generally
Reinhard Haas et al., Efficiency and Effectiveness of Promotion Systems for Electricity
Generation from Renewable Energy Sources - Lessons from EU Countries, 36 ENERGY 2186
(2011); Felix Mormann, Enhancing the Investor Appeal of Renewable Energy, 42 ENVTL. L.
681 (2012) [hereinafter Mormann, Investor Appeal of Renewable Energy].
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energy economy.17 To date, no systematic, comparative inquiry has probed into the
relative equity of the primary tools of public policy support for clean energy. This
Article seeks to help close that gap.
At first glance, equity may seem a less intuitive and harder-to-measure concept
than efficacy or efficiency, the current staples of clean energy policy. Properly
defined as the commensurate distribution of costs and benefits,18 however, equity
offers a reliable metric of a policy’s socio-economic impacts—a metric untainted by
the normative judgments underlying the many competing notions of fairness that
dominate the rhetoric in ongoing battles over the future of net energy metering and
other clean energy policies.19 To be clear, this Article was motivated by the author’s
normative concerns over equity deficiencies in today’s clean energy policy
landscape. And these concerns over the uneven distribution of economic
opportunities and costs form the basis of proposed pathways for policy reform.20
Not all policymakers, scholars, and other readers will share the author’s
normative valuation of equity improvements as a worthwhile goal for clean energy
policy design and implementation. Few will deny, however, that a better
understanding of the economic winners and losers a policy creates will result in more
informed choices going forward, for policymakers, voters, and other stakeholders.
17
See generally Shelley Welton & Joel B. Eisen, Clean Energy Justice: Charting an
Emerging Agenda, HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (calling on the academic
community to engage in a more holistic study of the distributive and procedural justice
concerns raised by the clean energy transition); Shelley Welton, Clean Electrification, 88 U.
COLO. L. REV. 571 (2017) [hereinafter Welton, Clean Electrification] (exploring the social
implications of a “participatory grid”); Uma Outka, Fairness in the Low-Carbon Shift:
Learning from Environmental Justice, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 789 (2017) (exploring the linkage
between climate change and environmental and energy justice); Troy A. Rule, Solar Energy,
Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 115 (2015) (taking stock of
the fairness arguments raised for and against promotion of solar rooftop installations through
net energy metering).
18
See, e.g., Benjamin K. Sovacool, An International Comparison of Four Polycentric
Approaches to Climate and Energy Governance, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 3832, 3841 (2011);
Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 17, at 577 n.19 (defining equity concerns as
“questions over how the benefits and burdens of the policies are allocated”); Daniel A.
Farber, Pollution Markets and Social Equity: Analyzing the Fairness of Cap and Trade, 39
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 7 (2012) (defining equity as the consideration of “uneven impact of a
program on different groups or individuals”). Use of the term “equity” for the purposes of
this Article should not be confused with the term’s use in the context of equity capital or tax
equity, both staples in the clean energy finance discourse. See, e.g., Felix Mormann, Beyond
Tax Credits: Smarter Tax Policy for a Cleaner, More Democratic Energy Future, 31 YALE
J. ON REG. 303 (2014) [hereinafter Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits] (discussing the challenges
for clean energy finance associated with scarcity of tax equity).
19
See Rule, supra note 17, at 116 (discussing the confusing use of fairness rhetoric on
both sides of the raging debate over net energy metering policies with the astute observation
that “[fa]irness is a notoriously fuzzy concept capable of describing a wide range of distinct
policy ideals”); Outka, supra note 17, at 793 (stating that “discordant notions of fairness are
competing for validation in the energy policy space”).
20
See infra Section III.F.
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The goal of the following analysis of case studies in clean energy policy,21 therefore,
is not to sell readers on the author’s normative convictions but, rather, to provide the
background necessary for readers to form their own normative judgments, including
but not limited to the “fairness,” of the current policy landscape. To this end, the
Article’s working definition of equity facilitates an in-depth inquiry into the
attribution of economic costs and benefits under select clean energy policies, tracing
the flow of capital required to fund these policies as well as the revenue flowing to
their economic beneficiaries.22
Some question the propriety of equity and other indicators of socio-economic
impact in the context of clean energy policies intended to reduce the world’s carbon
footprint and thereby help mitigate global climate change. This Article makes the
case that, in light of its transformative nature and repercussions felt across all sectors
of society, deep decarbonization cannot proceed successfully without regard for the
social implications of its enabling policy landscape. Moreover, energy law has long
recognized equity as a key metric for the design of rates for transmission services,
electric power, and natural gas, among others.23
Importantly, this Article does not seek to call into question the ongoing
transition toward a low-carbon, largely renewables-based energy economy. To be
sure, reduced reliance on oil, coal, and other carbon-intensive fossil fuels engenders
its own social challenges, such as jobs lost in mining, refining, and related sectors.24
But environmental and, ultimately, economic imperatives leave little room for
alternative courses of action if global warming is to be limited to the crucial 2-degree
Celsius mark.25 The social costs of persistent carbon emissions from a primarily
fossil-fueled power sector are simply too large to consider business as usual with
continued reliance on fossil fuels a viable option.26
The research goal of this inquiry, therefore, is not to question the “if” but rather
to assess and, ideally, improve the “how” of the shift toward a less carbon-intensive,
renewably fueled energy economy. To this end, the Article assesses the equity of a
21

See infra Section III.A–E.
As Professor William Boyd put it in his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
work, it is, indeed, a “follow-the-money” type of investigation.
23
See infra Part I.
24
See, e.g., DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. ENERGY AND EMPLOYMENT REPORT 23 (2017),
https://www.energy.gov/downloads/2017-us-energy-and-employment-report [https://perma.
cc/J96A-7D23] (describing the recent decline in employment in oil and gas extraction and
coal mining compared to job growth in solar and other renewable energy); Shalanda H. Baker
et al., Beyond Zero-Sum Environmentalism, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10328, 10344 (2017)
(discussing perceived trade-offs between environmentalists and the mining industry).
25
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
26
See, e.g., Jonathan Levy & Jack Spengler, Health Benefits of Emissions Reductions
from Older Power Plants, 9 RISK IN PERSP. 1, 2–4 (2001) (reporting on the high
concentration of air pollutants and adverse health impacts in the vicinity of coal and other
fossil-fueled power plants); Siler-Evans et al., supra note 8; Mathew E. Hauer & Jason N.
Evans, Millions Projected to Be at Risk from Sea-Level Rise in the Contintental United
States, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 691, 697 (2016) (highlighting the threat of mass
migration due to anthropogenic climate change).
22
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sampling of representative case studies from today’s potpourri of policies for the
promotion of solar, wind, and other renewables. Application of a uniform rating
scale across case studies is intended to allow policymakers to compare the relative
equity of competing options in the clean energy policy toolbox. These ratings offer
the basis for policy-specific reform suggestions to improve equity outcomes and
guide policymakers toward a more equitable, next generation of clean energy
policies.
As the project of decarbonization and its enabling policies continue to evolve,
equity will likely remain a moving target for policymakers. It is imperative,
therefore, that equity inquiries become part of the policymaking process, rather than
to be voiced post hoc by scholars and other outside critics. As regulators, utilities,
and ratepayers move toward an increasingly interactive grid powered by
renewables, 27 the process that produces its enabling policies and regulations must
also become more participatory. This Article suggests a modified version of Elinor
Ostrom’s Nobel prize-winning framework for polycentric governance as a model to
facilitate greater public participation—to produce a next generation of clean energy
policies that more transparently balances and reconciles efficacy, efficiency, and
equity considerations.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I makes the case for including equity
as a first-order consideration in clean energy policy design and implementation.
Part II gives a brief overview of the principal policies to promote clean energy
technologies in place today. Part III evaluates the equity of a sampling of case studies
that represent the current generation of clean energy policies and offers suggestions
for reform. Merging substance with process, Part IV draws on Elinor Ostrom’s
polycentric governance models to propose a more participatory policymaking
process that ensures greater consideration of equity concerns going forward.
I. THE CASE FOR EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS IN CLEAN ENERGY POLICY
To better understand the importance of equity considerations in clean energy
policy, this Part begins by surveying equity’s historic role in energy law (infra
Section I.A.), before making the case for greater focus on the equity of policy
pathways toward deep decarbonization beyond the literature’s current preoccupation
with an outcome-oriented investigation of the social implications of a deeply
decarbonized energy economy (infra Section I.B.). Part I closes by exploring the
proper place of equity in clean energy policymaking, alongside efficacy, efficiency,
and other top-level policy considerations (infra Section I.C).

27

See Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 17, at 584–85 (describing initiatives to
foster greater consumer participation in the electric grid).
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A. Equity’s Historic Role in Energy Law
Equity, or the notion of matching costs with benefits as the term is used in this
Article, has long been a staple of energy law and regulation in the United States. As
early as in the 1890s, electricity pioneer Samuel Insull used the Wright meter, a
novel device that, much like today’s “smart meters,” could record a customer’s
overall electricity consumption as well as the timing and maximum level of her
demand, to revolutionize the rate design for electric power.28 The meter’s detailed
data allowed Insull to replace the traditional flat rate for electricity with a two-tiered
rate structure.29 This new rate design used the customer’s overall consumption to
determine her share of the utility’s operating expenses, while her peak demand
represented the customer’s share in the utility’s capital investment to provide
sufficient generating capacity.30 In equity terms, this two-tiered rate structure
matched a customer’s benefits from electrical service to the costs the utility incurred
to provide that service.31 Natural gas pipeline rates reflect a similar commitment to
equity, with firm customers required to pay both a demand charge representing their
peak demand and a usage charge for their overall consumption, while customers who
agree to have their service interrupted in the event of a shortage only pay the usage
charge. 32
The allocation of costs for new transmission infrastructure offers another, more
recent example of energy law’s enduring commitment to equity. In 2011, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) adopted Order 1000 in part to prevent free
ridership by those who benefit from new transmission projects without sharing in
their cost.33 To this end, FERC adopted a set of cost allocation principles requiring
that “all regional and interregional cost allocation methods allocate costs for new
transmission facilities in a manner that is at least roughly commensurate with the
benefits received by those who will pay those costs.”34 The language used by FERC
in Order 1000 is not novel but, rather, reflects energy law’s well-established “cost
28

See HAROLD L. PLATT, THE ELECTRIC CITY: ENERGY AND THE GROWTH OF THE
CHICAGO AREA, 1880–1930, at 141–42 (1991).
29
Id. at 126.
30
Id. at 139–42.
31
This type of matching has since become a staple of electricity rate regulation. See,
e.g., Alabama Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. FERC, 684 F.2d 20, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“Properly
designed rates should produce revenues from each class of customers which match, as
closely as practicable, the costs to serve each class or individual customer.”) (emphasis
omitted) (internal quotation omitted).
32
In the wake of restructuring, federal regulations prohibit interstate natural gas
pipelines from charging customers with interruptible service with a demand or reservation
fee. See 18 C.F.R. § 284.9(c); see also Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Montana Power Co., 97 F.
Supp. 2d 1013, 1019 (D. Mont. 2000) (describing the mechanics of firm and interruptible
natural gas service).
33
See Transmission Planning & Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning & Operating
Public Utilities, 18 C.F.R. 35, 136 FERC ¶ 61051 (July 21, 2011).
34
Id.; see also Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 770 (7th Cir. 2013)
(offering an illustrative example of such cost-benefit matching).
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causation” principle. Anchored in the Federal Power Act’s requirement that rates be
“just and reasonable,”35 cost causation requires that rates reflect the costs actually
caused by the customer who must pay them.36 In a near-perfect reprise of the
economics literature’s definition of equity, courts assess compliance with the cost
causation principle “by comparing the costs assessed against a party to the burdens
imposed or benefits drawn by that party.”37
Some commentators view energy law’s reliance on the cost causation principle
as an (over)emphasis of efficiency at the possible expense of equity.38 Critics
bemoan that causal allocation of costs creates a barrier to access for lower-income
consumers whose electricity and natural gas rates should be discounted.39
Notwithstanding their merit in ensuring widespread access to affordable energy, rate
discounts and rebates for lower-income households do not fall within the purview
of equity as that term is defined in the economics literature and used here.40 To
characterize the cost causation principle as running counter to equity objectives
confuses equity with more normative concepts such as distributional fairness or
social sustainability.41
B. Policy Equity Before Outcome Equity
Notwithstanding the robust body of scholarship on the role of fairness in law
generally,42 legal scholars are only just beginning to explore the appropriate role, if
35

16 U.S.C. § 824d(a); see also 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (discussing the regulation of
natural gas rates).
36
See, e.g., KN Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1295, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2000);
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1315, 1320–21 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
37
Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing
Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1361, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 2004)); see
also William Boyd, Just Price, Public Utility, and the Long History of Economic Regulation
in America, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 721, 727 (2018) (noting “reciprocity . . . in exchange” as a
core element of the public utility idea).
38
See, e.g., Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 17, at 609–10 (noting that
“scholars have long portrayed the field of public utility law as a protracted ideological battle
between ‘equity’ on the one hand and ‘efficiency’ on the other”).
39
Id. at 610.
40
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
41
For a snapshot of the burgeoning literature on social sustainability, see, e.g., Thomas
M. Parris & Robert W. Kates, Characterizing and Measuring Sustainable Development, 28
ANN. REV. OF ENV’T & RES. 559, 561 (2003) (noting the importance of equal opportunity for
the taxonomy of sustainable development); G. Assefa & B. Frostell, Social Sustainability
and Social Acceptance in Technology Assessment: A Case Study of Energy Technologies, 29
TECH. SOC’Y 63, 65 (2007) (highlighting the role of “fairness in distribution and opportunity”
for socially sustainable systems); see also Mormann, supra note 12 (offering a framework
of proxy criteria to assess the social sustainability of clean energy policies).
42
See, e.g., FAIRNESS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H.
McAdams eds., 2013) (featuring a collection of scholarly articles on fairness).
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any, for concepts such as fairness and equity in renewable energy policy. In a recent
article,43 Professor Troy Rule has posed the critical question to which extent, if any,
fairness considerations should drive energy policy.44 He finds that the multitude of
competing definitions renders fairness a potentially elusive goal to pursue as
stakeholders frequently differ in their views of what would constitute a fair
outcome.45 Rule concludes that polarizing fairness rhetoric in the clean energy
discourse is unlikely to produce the policy landscape that will create a sustainable
energy future.46
Replacing the “notoriously fuzzy”47 concept of fairness with a less normatively
defined notion of equity (closer to this Article’s working definition), Professor
Shelley Welton has probed into the social implications of a participatory electric
grid that encourages ratepayers to make behavioral changes and adopt innovative
technologies in order to keep electricity affordable.48 She argues that ongoing
debates over the distributional impacts of clean energy should be resolved through
a renewed focus on electricity law’s original commitment to facilitating widespread
access to affordable power.49 While Professors Rule and Welton differ in the precise
metric by which to judge the social implications of clean energy (fairness vs. equity),
both their inquiries share a focus on the ultimate policy outcomes, framed in terms
of a sustainable energy future and access to affordable clean electricity, respectively.
This Article seeks to expand the discourse by focusing not only on the equity
(or fairness) of an eventual policy outcome but, critically, also on the equity of the
policy measures adopted in pursuit of said outcome. The global potpourri of policies
to promote clean, renewable energy offers ample evidence of how different policy
pathways can lead to the same outcome. As these policies seek to leverage trillions
of dollars50 for clean energy investment, they inevitably impact income and wealth
distribution among the affected citizenry.51 Pareto optimality in the sense of making
everyone better off and no one worse off is beyond the reach of virtually all law and
policy.52 The importance of outcome equity as the focus of recent scholarship is
undisputed. This Article posits that policy equity, that is, the commensurate
43

See Rule, supra note 17, at 116 (“This basic question underlies much of the current
debate over the net metering programs and related policies . . . .”).
44
See infra Section II.C.
45
See Rule, supra note 17, at 127.
46
Id. at 148; see also Outka, supra note 17, at 810 (observing that “competing
conceptions of fairness in the distributed solar context are widely divergent”).
47
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
48
See Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 17, at 585 (offering examples of what
a participatory grid could look like).
49
Id. at 649.
50
See, e.g., INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 21 (2016) (“An
increasing slice of the roughly $1.8 trillion of investment each year in the energy sector has
been attracted to clean energy . . . .”).
51
See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further,
100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1214 (1991).
52
Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of
Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 792–93 (1993).
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distribution of costs and benefits a policy creates along the path to said outcome,
logically comes first. The case for policy equity is especially strong in the context
of a task as Herculean in scope as decarbonization, with policy timelines measured
in decades rather than years. Policymakers and scholars alike would do well,
therefore, to include both outcome and policy equity considerations as they design
and implement the next generation of clean energy policies.
C. The Proper Role for Equity in Clean Energy Policy
Equity does not operate in a vacuum. It is but one of many aspects for
policymakers to consider as they craft clean energy policies, chief among them the
current staples of policy design and analysis—efficacy and efficiency. In a policy
equation with three variables “e,” how do you know which “e” to solve for? This
conundrum is further complicated by the fact that efficacy, efficiency, and equity all
interact in a variety of ways.53
Consider the fundamental requirement that a policy must produce some,
however minimal, deployment of clean energy technology to create the empirical
evidence necessary to properly assess its efficiency. Simple as this may sound, not
every policy passes the basic efficacy test. The city of Palo Alto’s 2012 solar feedin tariff, for example, failed to incentivize any deployment during the first three
years of its existence.54 An equity inquiry may help explain the policy’s lack of
efficacy, perhaps as the result of targeting too few potential developers and other
economic beneficiaries. At the other end of the efficacy spectrum, a policy that
delivers significantly higher-than-expected deployment may offer overly generous
incentives, raising concerns over windfall benefits for developers and, ultimately,
the policy’s cost efficiency. Oregon’s Solar Photovoltaic Volumetric Incentive
Program55 illustrates this dynamic. Initial rates of up to $0.65 per kilowatt-hour of
solar electricity led to substantial oversubscription of early deployment rounds
prompting widespread criticism of the program as wasteful and inefficient.56
Efficiency and equity have a similarly complex relationship. The scholarly
literature has long debated the tension between equity and efficiency in energy law.57

53
Making a similar point, albeit in the broader context of sustainable development, see
J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for Environmental Law,
18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 31, 31 (1999) (“Environment, economy, and social equity are not
mutually exclusive, hermetically sealed spheres of life.”).
54
See Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, supra note 14, at 1661.
55
See OR. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC VOLUMETRIC INCENTIVE
PROGRAM: REPORT TO THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 2–3 (2013).
56
See, e.g., OR. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, UM 1505, SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC COMMENTS
AND REGULATIONS 3 (2011) (statement of Dave Sullivan) (“The incentive rates were at least
30 percent too high . . . .”).
57
See, e.g., Welton, supra note 17, at 609–10 (“scholars have long portrayed the field
of public utility law as a protracted ideological battle between ‘equity,’ on the one hand, and
‘efficiency,’ on the other”); Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &
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In reality, both may but need not necessarily pull in opposite directions. In some
instances, equity improvements may produce sizeable gains in policy efficiency, as
demonstrated by the American Recovery and Reconstruction Act’s impact on U.S.
wind power development. When the Act’s § 1603 grant temporarily allowed clean
energy developers to choose a direct cash subsidy in lieu of their traditional tax
credits,58 the pool of direct economic beneficiaries increased dramatically beyond
the small group of banks and highly profitable corporations able to monetize tax
credits in a timely fashion.59 Remarkably, these gains in policy equity resulted in a
100% increase in policy efficiency.60 Figure 2 illustrates the intricate connections
and interactions among policy efficacy, efficiency, and equity.

Figure 2: Interconnectedness Among Policy Efficacy, Efficiency, and Equity

MGMT. SCI. 22, 44 (1971); EDWARD E. ZAJAC, FAIRNESS OR EFFICIENCY: AN INTRODUCTION
TO PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING (1978).
58
See Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
59
For a discussion of the challenges in monetizing federal tax incentives and their
implications for policy equity, see infra Section III.D.
60
See Ethan Zindler & Tyler Tringas, Cash Is King: Shortcomings of US Tax Credits
in Subsidizing Renewables, BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. 1 (2009) (“One dollar in cash
has, on average, gone twice as far as one dollar of tax credits in subsidizing wind.”);
Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits, supra note 18, at 319–23 (comparing the policy efficiency
of federal tax credits and cash subsidies for wind energy deployment).
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In light of the above, it is easy to see why equity should not be misconstrued as
the trump card in the clean energy policy deck. Rather, it is one consideration among
many for policymakers to balance in a multi-factorial framework. And there may
well be instances where deviations from equity’s tenet of a commensurate
distribution of costs and benefits are called for, for example in the interest of
universal access to electric service. One such instance is reflected in the “lifeline
rates” encouraged by the 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act to meet the
essential needs of low-income residential consumers by offering electricity at rates
below the utility’s actual cost.61 The cross-subsidization inherent in these and other
discount energy programs for low-income households results in an uneven
distribution of economic benefits and costs. But that distortionary effect should not
a priori eliminate them from the public policy toolbox. After all, cross-subsidies can
serve efficiency as well as other important social goals.62 This Article’s equity lens
helps draw attention to cross-subsidies and other mismatches between the allocation
of costs and benefits in order to facilitate the public scrutiny necessary to ensure that
they are, in fact, used in furtherance of important public policy objectives, and not
for hand-outs to special interest groups or pork barreling.63
II. CLEAN ENERGY POLICY TODAY: AN OVERVIEW
Policies to promote solar, wind, and other renewable energy technologies can
take a variety of forms. Economists have long suggested that pricing greenhouse gas
emissions, in the form of a carbon tax64 or cap-and-trade regime,65 is, in theory at
least, the single most efficient policy to mitigate climate change and promote
abatement technologies, such as solar, wind, and other low-carbon renewables. 66 A
price on greenhouse gas emissions would require producers to internalize the cost
of their emissions and thereby penalize pollution and encourage abatement. Over
time, this direct, static effect would be complemented by an indirect, dynamic effect
of encouraging the refinement of existing and development of new abatement
61

See 16 U.S.C. § 2624. For a review of electricity rate discount programs in the United
States, see STEVEN FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER § 10:17 (2018).
62
See Rule, supra note 17, at 131, 133.
63
See, e.g., CHARLES WEISS & WILLIAM B. BONVILLIAN, STRUCTURING AN ENERGY
TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 208 (2009) (noting the risk of pork barreling inherent in energy
policy incentive programs).
64
See, e.g., Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499 (2009).
65
See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade and
Complimentary Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207 (2012).
66
See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 348 (2007);
Dominique Finon, Pros and Cons of Alternative Policies Aimed at Promoting Renewables,
12 EIB PAPERS 110, 112 (2007); Adam B. Jaffe et al., A Tale of Two Market Failures:
Technology and Environmental Policy, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 164, 165, 169 (2005); Atanas
Kolev & Armin Riess, Environmental and Technology Externalities: Policy and Investment
Implications, 12 EIB PAPERS 134, 140 (2007).
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technologies.67 From an efficiency perspective, a tax on greenhouse gas emissions
or a cap-and-trade scheme would incur lower opportunity costs than direct public
policy support for specific clean energy technologies.68 Notwithstanding its
theoretical appeal, the adoption of a nationwide or, better yet, global policy regime
that accurately prices the societal cost of greenhouse gas emissions is politically
unlikely in the near-to-medium term.69 Accordingly, this Article focuses its equity
inquiry on policies directly aimed at promoting the large-scale deployment of solar,
wind, and other renewables.
Around the world, feed-in tariffs (infra Section II.A.) dominate the clean energy
policy landscape, followed by tender regimes (infra Section II.B.) and net energy
metering programs (infra Section II.C.).70 In the United States, federal policy
support for renewables comes primarily in the form of tax credits71
(infra Section II.D.) while twenty-nine states, three territories, and the District of
Columbia have adopted renewable portfolio standards (infra Section II.E.) to
promote solar, wind, and other renewables.72
A. Feed-in Tariffs
Feed-in tariffs are two-pronged policy instruments for the promotion of
renewables deployment.73 The “feed-in” prong guarantees renewable power
generators access to their local power grid in order to ensure viable sales and

67

See Kolev & Riess, supra note 66, at 137 (discussing the impact of environmental
policy on technological change).
68
See Felix Mormann, Requirements for a Renewables Revolution, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q.
901, 929 (2011) [hereinafter Mormann, Renewables Revolution].
69
For issues related to the political economy of emission pricing, see id. at 930–32. For
evidence of the failed campaigns for a federal cap-and-trade regime, see S. 1733, 111th
Cong. (2010) and H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). See also Gary Lucas, Jr., Voter Psychology
and the Carbon Tax, 90 TEMPLE L. REV. 1 (2017) (discussing how a variety of biases and
heuristics influence the electorate’s perception of carbon taxation).
70
See REN21 2015, supra note 4, at 89 (listing nearly eighty countries with feed-in
tariffs, sixty with tender regimes, and close to fifty with net energy metering programs).
71
See Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits, supra note 18, at 311–17, 319–23 (describing
and critiquing federal tax credit support for renewable energy in the United States).
72
See N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR., RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD POLICIES
1 (2017), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Renew
able-Portfolio-Standards.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2TQ-VVTF]. Eight more states and one U.S.
territory have adopted nonbinding goals for the deployment of renewables. See id. For a
discussion of the history and political background of state renewable portfolio standards, see
Barry Rabe, Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable Portfolio
Standards, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 10, 10 (2007).
73
Wilson H. Rickerson et al., If the Shoe FITs: Using Feed-in Tariffs to Meet U.S.
Renewable Electricity Targets, 20 THE ELECTRICITY J. 73, 73 (2007). For a detailed
description of the various feed-in tariff design elements, see MIGUEL MENDONÇA ET AL.,
POWERING THE GREEN ECONOMY – THE FEED-IN TARIFF HANDBOOK 15–16 (2010).
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distribution channels for their electricity.74 The “tariff” prong requires local electric
utilities to purchase the power output of these generators at above-market rates that
are designed to cover the generator’s cost and offer a reasonable return on
investment.75 These rates can be set as a fixed total price for electricity from
renewables, a premium to be paid in addition to the market price, or a percentage of
retail rates.76 While renewable portfolio standards let the market determine trading
prices for renewable energy credits and, hence, the overall value of renewable
electricity, feed-in tariffs require regulators to set tariff rates at a level that is high
enough to effectively incentivize investment in renewable power generation without
offering windfall profits.77 Like portfolio standards, feed-in tariffs pass the costs of
premium payments for renewable energy onto ratepayers.78 Feed-in tariffs are
usually technology-specific, offering different tariff rates for different strands of
renewable energy technologies based on their respective technological maturity and
generation costs.79 In addition, feed-in tariff design can be size-sensitive so as to
account for the different cost structures of utility-scale and distributed generation.80
Historically, feed-in tariffs have been particularly popular in European countries
such as Denmark, Germany, Portugal, and Spain.81 Recent U.S. adopters of feed-in

74

Rickerson et al., supra note 73, at 1.
The first-ever feed-in tariff in the United States, implemented with great success by
the municipality of Gainesville, Florida, was designed to offer a return on investment of five
to six percent. See KARLYNN CORY ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., FEED-IN
TARIFF POLICY: DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, AND RPS POLICY INTERACTIONS (2009),
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/45549.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N3MP-PMNK].
The
duration of the utility’s purchase obligation under a feed-in tariff ranges from 8 years in
Spain to 15 years in France to 20 years in Germany. See Finon, supra note 66, at 115.
76
The second option is sometimes referred to as a “feed-in premium” or “premium
feed-in tariff.” See MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 73, at 40. For an example of the retail rate
percentage option. See Butler & Neuhoff, supra note 15, at 1855. Unless expressly stated
otherwise, this Article refers to all of these options uniformly as feed-in tariffs.
77
MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 73, at 19.
78
Id. at 29.
79
Id. For an example of cost reductions through technology learning in solar
photovoltaics and onshore wind energy, see IPCC, RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES, supra
note 2.
80
MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 73, at 27.
81
See IEA 2008, supra note 15, at 94. For further background, see David Grinlinton &
LeRoy Paddock, The Role of Feed-in Tariffs in Supporting the Expansion of Solar Energy
Production, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 943, 949 (2010). More recently, many jurisdictions outside
of Europe have adopted FITs to promote renewable energy, including the Canadian province
of Ontario, South Africa, Kenya, the Indian states West Bengal, Rajasthan, Gujarat, and
Punjab, as well as Australia’s Capital Territory, New South Wales, and South Australia. See
MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 73, at 77.
75
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tariff programs to promote renewables include California,82 Hawaii,83 Maine,84
Oregon,85 Rhode Island,86 Vermont,87 and Washington.88
B. Tender Regimes
Under a tender regime—sometimes described as a reverse auction
mechanism89—the government invites competitive bids to supply a specified
amount of electricity from a certain renewable energy technology over a predetermined period of time.90 The successful bidder is awarded a long-term power
purchase contract at its winning bid’s price per kilowatt hour (kWh). The additional
cost, i.e., the winning bid’s premium over the market rate of electricity, is usually
recovered through a levy or system benefits charge that is distributed across all
ratepayers. 91 Tender regimes are inherently technology-specific, as the call for bids
specifies the eligible strand of renewable energy technologies.92
China, France, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and some states in the United
States have used tender regimes to promote the deployment of various renewable

82
83

See S.B. 32, 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2008).
See HAW. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, DECISIONS

AND

ORDERS, DOCKET 2008-0273,

(2008).
84

See An Act to Establish the Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff, S.P. 367, 126th Leg.,
(Me. 2013).
85
See H.B. 3039, 75th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); H.B. 3690, 75th Leg. Spec.
Sess. (Or. 2010).
86
See H.B. 6104 (R.I. 2011).
87
See Public Act No. 45, Bien. Sess. (Vt. 2009); Public Act No. 170, Adj. Sess. (Vt.
2012).
88
See, e.g., S.B. 5101, 66th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005); S.B. 6170, 61st Leg. Reg.
Sess. (Wash. 2009); S.B. 6658, 61st Leg. Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2010).
89
See Christian Jaag & Urs Trinkner, Tendering Universal Service Obligations in
Liberalized Network Industries, 10 COMPETITION & REG. NETWORK INDUSTRIES 314 (2009),
http://www.swiss-economics.ch/RePEc/files/0013JaagTrinkner.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LBA
-KEJ6] (providing an introduction to the terminology and mechanics of tender regimes /
reverse auction mechanisms in liberalized markets).
90
See Claus Huber et al., Economic Modelling of Price Support Mechanisms for
Renewable Energy: Case Study on Ireland, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 1172 (2007); IEA 2008, supra
note 15, at 92 (providing further information on tender regimes in the renewable electricity
context).
91
Robert Gross & Phil Heptonstall, Time to Stop Experimenting with UK Renewable
Energy Policy 8 (Imperial Coll. Ctr. for Energy Policy and Tech., Working Paper No.
ICEPT/WP/2010/003, 2010), http://www.biee.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/Time_to_
stop_experimenting_with_UK_renewable_energy_policy_2010_pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/
S35X-XKHR].
92
See MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 73, at 174–75.
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energy technologies.93 Denmark, too, has recently relied on tender regimes for
offshore wind farms.94
C. Net Energy Metering Programs
Net energy metering has evolved into the primary mechanism for tracking and
rewarding distributed renewable energy generation in the United States.95 Following
the policy’s early adoption by Idaho, Arizona, and Massachusetts back in the 1980s,
net metering has since proliferated to over forty states.96 Notwithstanding some
variation across programs, net energy metering generally allows an electric utility’s
customer to run her meter forward while consuming power from the grid and
backward while feeding power into the grid, e.g., from solar panels on her rooftop.97
At the end of the billing period, the utility charges the customer for the amount of
power consumed from the grid minus power generated on-site and fed into the grid.98
So long as the customer-generator, on balance, consumes more electricity from the
grid than she feeds in, her locally generated power is effectively remunerated at the
retail electricity rate.99
D. Tax Credits
For more than two decades, tax incentives have been the federal policy of
choice to promote the deployment of renewable energy technologies.100 These tax
breaks come primarily in the form of two distinct instruments—accelerated

93

See, e.g., Bent Ole Gram Mortenson, International Experiences of Wind Energy, 2
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 179, 201 (2008); Reinhard Haas et al., A Historical Review
of Promotion Strategies for Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources in EU Countries, 15
RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY RES. 1003, 1020 (2011); MENDONÇA ET AL., supra
note 73, at 174–75.
94
Haas et al., supra note 16, at 1020.
95
See REN21 2015, supra note 4, at 89; see also U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S.
DEP’T ENERGY, DIRECT FED. FIN. INTERVENTIONS & SUBSIDIES IN ENERGY IN FISCAL YEAR
2013 (2015), https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/archive/2013/pdf/subsidy.pdf.
96
See Richard L. Revesz & Burcin Unel, Managing the Future of the Electricity Grid:
Distributed Generation and Net Metering, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 43, 47, 59 (2017).
97
See, e.g., EDISON ELEC. INST., STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT NET METERING 1–2 (2013).
98
See, e.g., Steven Ferrey, Solving the Multimillion Dollar Constitutional Puzzle
Surrounding State “Sustainable” Energy Policy, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 121, 128–29
(2014).
99
See, e.g., NAIM R. DARGHOUTH ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., NET
METERING AND MARKET FEEDBACK LOOPS: EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF RETAIL RATE
DESIGN ON DISTRIBUTED PV DEPLOYMENT 1 (2015), http://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbnl183185_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q43S-QDPW].
100
See Mark Bolinger et al., Preliminary Evaluation of the Section 1603 Treasury
Grant Program for Renewable Power Projects in the United States, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 6804
(2010).
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depreciation rates101 and tax credits.102 From an economic perspective, tax credits
tend to be of relatively greater importance to renewable energy deployment than
accelerated depreciation.103 Accordingly, this Article focuses on tax credits. Federal
tax policy seeks to promote the deployment of renewable energy technologies
through two types of credits. Production tax credits reward the generation of
electricity from renewable sources by awarding eligible facilities tax credits in
proportion to the quantity of electricity they produce and feed into the grid.104
Investment tax credits honor capital expenditures in equipment for renewable power
generation by awarding eligible projects tax credits equal to a percentage of their
qualifying investment costs.105 The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016
recently extended tax credits for solar and wind by another five years.106
E. Renewable Portfolio Standards
A renewable portfolio standard, also known as a renewable target or quota
obligation, requires electric utility companies to source a certain share of the
electricity they sell to end-users from renewable sources of energy.107 Utilities prove
their compliance with these requirements through “renewable energy credits”
(RECs).108 Power plant operators normally receive one such credit for every
megawatt hour (MWh) of electricity generated from renewable resources.109 Nonutility power generators can sell their renewable energy credits to utilities in order
to receive a premium on top of their income from power sales in the wholesale
electricity market. Utilities subject to a renewable portfolio standard’s sourcing
requirements can also invest in their own renewable power generation facilities to
earn renewable energy credits for the electricity they produce. Whether utilities
choose to earn their own credits or purchase them from others, they eventually pass

101

See generally Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
(creating the accelerated depreciation rates that renewable energy assets enjoy today).
102
See generally Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776
(1992) (creating the first Federal tax credits for renewable energy for wind power).
103
See Chadbourne & Parke LLP, State of the Tax Equity Market, PROJECT FINANCE
NEWSWIRE 28, 29 (2012). In fact, one industry insider has stated that “[m]any tax equity
investors have turned their noses up at the bonus [depreciation rates].” Id. at 33.
104
See 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2018).
105
See 26 U.S.C. § 48 (2018).
106
See Felix Mormann, Fading into the Sunset: Solar and Wind Get Five More Years
of Tax Credits with a Phase-Down, 47 ABA TRENDS 9, 9–10 (2016).
107
For details, see Haas et al., supra note 16, at 1011–12; MENDONÇA ET AL., supra
note 73, at 150–51.
108
MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 73, at 161. Internationally, renewable energy credits
are also referred to as Tradable Green Certificates or Renewable Energy Guarantees of
Origin. Id. at 155.
109
See Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42
CONN. L. REV. 1339, 1359, 1378 (2010) (reporting that some states award RECs for every
kWh of renewable electricity generation).
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the associated costs on to their ratepayers.110 Many portfolio standards are
technology-neutral and award the same amount of credits for all eligible renewable
energy technologies. More and more jurisdictions, however, implement technologyspecific renewable portfolio standards, that offer carve-outs or credit multipliers for
select renewable energy technologies and projects based on size and location.111 In
1983, Iowa became the first state in the union to adopt a renewable portfolio
standard.112 Today, twenty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and three U.S.
territories have adopted portfolio standards to promote the large-scale deployment
of renewable energy technologies.113 International adopters of renewable portfolio
standard policies include Australia, Belgium, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.114
III. ASSESSING THE EQUITY OF TODAY’S CLEAN ENERGY POLICIES
This Part explores the policy equity of a representative sampling of clean
energy policies in place today. The costs and benefits generated under a policy vary
in terms of the immediacy and saliency of their accrual. The monetary incentives
offered and the taxes or charges imposed to fund them represent the type of benefits
and costs that are relatively easy to attribute to a specific clean energy policy. In
addition to these direct costs and benefits, the following inquiry also considers a
policy’s more indirect impacts on participants in the respective energy economy,
such as the burden on ratepayers to fund balancing services for intermittent
renewables or wholesale market price reductions resulting from the displacement of
less efficient and more expensive peaker plants.115
It is important to note that the present assessment is limited to select economic
impacts and does not extend to a policy’s impact on greenhouse gas emissions, air
pollution, or other environmental outcomes. The decision to exclude environmental
costs and benefits from the scope of inquiry is motivated by two observations. First,
assuming their effectiveness in facilitating the intended deployment of solar, wind
and other clean energy technologies, all of the examined policies should yield similar
110

See id. at 1374.
See Felix Mormann, Constitutional Challenges and Regulatory Opportunities for
State Climate Policy Innovation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 198 (2017) [hereinafter
Mormann, State Climate Policy Innovation].
112
See Davies, supra note 109, at 1357.
113
See N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR., RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD POLICIES
(2015), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Renewable
-Portfolio-Standards.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2TQ-VVTF]. Eight more states and one U.S.
territory have adopted nonbinding goals for the deployment of renewables. Id. For a
discussion of the history and political background of state renewable portfolio standards, see
Barry Rabe, Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable Portfolio
Standards, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 10 (2007).
114
See MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 73, at 151; IEA 2008, supra note 15, at 94–95.
115
See also Revesz & Unel, supra note 96, at 78–79 (offering a similar taxonomy in
their exploration of the impact of distributed generation on the “parties involved in the
transactions that take place in the electricity market”).
111
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environmental benefits.116 When controlling for variations in deployment efficacy,
differences in net carbon reduction, air pollution abatement and other environmental
outcomes are more likely attributable to the respective electricity market’s preexisting resource mix and other exogenous factors than to the underlying policy.117
Second, most of the environmental benefits delivered by clean energy technologies
and their enabling policies accrue at a regional, if not global level, with limited
potential for appropriation and exclusion, raising fewer equity concerns than their
economic counterparts.118
As always, when evaluating and comparing policies, it is important to
differentiate between general issues related to policy equity that arise from a policy’s
conception and more particularized issues that result from the specific
implementation of said policy. In a world without resource constraints (or word
limits), increasing the sample size to ten or more case studies per policy might
facilitate a better differentiation between concept- and implementation-related
issues. A sampling of fifty-plus policies, however, would likely require sacrificing
analytical depth for jurisdictional breadth. The following inquiry, therefore, is
limited to one representative case study for each of today’s five most dominant clean
energy policies. Unless otherwise indicated, any insights apply only to the policy as
implemented in that particular case. The choice of case studies was based on the
availability of pertinent data as well as the respective jurisdiction’s role as a thought
leader and role model for the policy in question.
To facilitate a better comparison across policies, policy equity is rated on a
four-step scale ranging from poor to moderate to good to excellent, applied to the
matching of direct and indirect costs and benefits, respectively. Table 1 illustrates
this qualitative grading scale.
Rating
Excellent
Good
Moderate
Poor

Policy Equity Characteristics
Matching distribution of costs and benefits
Substantial match in distribution of costs and benefits
Partial match in distribution of costs and benefits
Severe mismatch in distribution of costs and benefits

Table 1: Rating Scale and Criteria for Case Study Analysis
116
The same rationale motivates the exclusion of macro-economic benefits, such as job
creation and tax revenue. For an international discussion of the employment effects of tax
incentives, feed-in tariffs, and renewable portfolio standards, among other policies, see
Mormann et al., supra note 8, at 74–76 (comparing job creation across California, Texas,
and Germany); see also Welton & Eisen, supra note 17, at 28–35 (exploring the distribution
of “green jobs”).
117
Which policy delivers the greatest environmental bang for the ratepayers’ or
taxpayers’ buck is a separate question, explored in detail, in the rich literature focused on the
relative efficiency of clean energy policies. See supra note 15.
118
See, e.g., Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, supra note 14, at 1638–41
(surveying the various environmental benefits associated with solar, wind, and other clean
energy technologies as well as the scope of their accrual).
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A. Feed-in Tariffs – Case Study Germany
Germany’s feed-in tariff experience has elicited a mixed response. Some praise
the country’s “healthy” feed-in tariff and the resulting “proliferation of solar
systems.”119 Others consider it “clear that the transformation, if plausible, will be
wrenching”120 as “German families are being hit by rapidly increasing electricity
rates.”121 This critique reflects concern over the social implications of Germany’s
feed-in tariff implementation to promote solar, wind, and other low-carbon
renewables. Based on this Article’s inquiry, the German feed-in tariff system scores
moderately in overall terms of policy equity’s tenet of commensurately matching
the program’s costs and benefits.
On the positive side, the German feed-in tariff system creates direct economic
opportunities open to a wide swath of the country’s population. Unlike competing
policies,122 feed-in tariffs incur very low transaction costs thanks, in large part, to
the local utility’s obligation to execute a power purchase agreement based on
standard terms that guarantee the full tariff payment without the need for timeconsuming and, hence, costly negotiations. It is up to the local utility in cooperation
with other network operators to recover the cost of the feed-in tariff from its
ratepayers. 123 In addition, Germany’s system of feed-in tariffs differentiates among
a diverse portfolio of technologies, project sizes and sites to create a wide range of
development opportunities. In total, the Renewable Energy Sources Law establishes
some thirty different tariffs custom-tailored to address the needs of over ten distinct
renewable energy technologies and applications while also accounting for
differences in size, location, etc.124 The hair in Germany’s feed-in tariff soup, as far
as access to its economic benefits is concerned, lies in the fact that, as a general
matter, only owners of real property but no tenants can make use of the program’s
financial incentives.
The German feed-in tariff’s overall equity rating is brought down by its regime
for allocating direct program costs. Critics of Germany’s Energiewende125 decry that
119

John Pang et al., Germany’s Energiewende, 152 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 14, 14 (2014).
Justin Gillis, Sun and Wind Alter Global Landscape, Leaving Utilities Behind, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2014, at A1.
121
Melissa Eddy & Stanley Reed, Germany’s Effort at Clean Energy Proves Complex,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2013, at A6; see also Matthew Karnitschnig, Germany’s Expensive
Gamble on Renewable Energy, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
germanys-expensive-gamble-on-renewable-energy-1409106602
[https://perma.cc/69ZP53SS].
122
See infra Sections III.D–E.
123
See MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 73, at xxii fig.0.1 (offering an instructive
overview of the flow of payments under Germany’s feed-in tariff).
124
See Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz [EEG] [Renewable Energies Act], July 21, 2014,
§§ 40—51 (Ger.), http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/eeg_2014/ge-samt.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5VCV-J4CX].
125
For an introduction to Germany’s ambitious energy policy, sometimes translated as
“energy transition,” see FED. MINISTRY OF ECON. AND TECH., GERMANY’S NEW ENERGY
120
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“German families are being hit by rapidly increasing electricity rates” and
“[b]usinesses are more and more worried that their energy costs will put them at a
disadvantage to competitors in nations with lower energy costs . . . .”126 These
concerns are warranted insofar as the levy imposed on residential ratepayers to
finance Germany’s commitment to renewables has steadily grown in recent years,
accounting for eight cents per kWh or 24 percent of average residential retail rates
in 2017.127 Overall, however, the feed-in tariff surcharge is only the second largest
driver of residential power pricing, behind grid-related charges (26 percent) but
ahead of energy procurement costs (19 percent) and applicable taxes (23 percent).128
The main criticism to be leveled against Germany’s feed-in tariffs, from an
equity perspective, is that the cost burden is not spread evenly among ratepayers.
The Renewable Energy Sources Law exempts nearly 2,000 electricity-intensive
industrial customers, such as large-scale chemical, steel, and paper industries, from
part, if not all, of the feed-in tariff levy.129 When those who consume the most
electricity contribute the least—if anything—to funding policies for the energy
economy’s decarbonization, policy equity suffers due to the mismatch between
widely available economic benefits but selectively borne costs.130
Germany’s feed-in tariffs perform moderately as far as indirect program costs
and benefits are concerned. On the positive side, the “merit-order effect” that
determines the order in which network operators call on, or dispatch, available
POL’Y (2012), http://www.bmwi.de/English/Redaktion/Pdf/germanys-new-energy-policy
[https://perma.cc/44PM-3JFF].
126
Eddy & Reed, supra note 121.
127
See BUNDESVERBAND DER ENERGIE UND WASSERWIRTSCHAFT, ERNEUERBARE
ENERGIEN UND DAS EEG: ZAHLEN, FAKTEN, GRAFIKEN 29 (2017), https://www.bdew.de/
media/documents/Awh_20170710_Erneuerbare-Energien-EEG_2017.pdf [https://perma.
cc/P46T-XTMB] [hereinafter BDEW 2017].
128
Id.
129
See BUNDESVERBAND DER ENERGIE UND WASSERWIRTSCHAFT, ERNEUERBARE
ENERGIEN UND DAS EEG: ZAHLEN, FAKTEN, GRAFIKEN 51 (2014), https://www.bdew.de/
internet.nsf/id/bdew-publikation-erneuerbare-energien-und-das-eeg-zahlen-fakten-grafiken
-2014-de/$file/Energie-Info_Erneuerbare% 20Energien%20und%20das%20EEG%202014
_korr%2027.02.2014_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9JQ-C35K] [hereinafter BDEW 2014];
see also Mormann et al., supra note 8, at 73 (placing Germany’s electricity cost in
international and macroeconomic context); BDEW 2017, supra note 127, at 33 (estimating
that, in 2017, exempt industrial ratepayers consumed 140 TWh while paying only a fraction,
if any, of the feed-in tariff levy).
130
The German legislature’s decision to exempt major industrial players from funding
the nation’s feed-in tariff is a good example of the multi-factorial decisionmaking process
that policymakers have to engage in. From a social perspective, the exemption may have
been viewed as the only way (short of border adjustments made difficult by the country’s
E.U. membership) to ensure the domestic industry’s international competitiveness and, with
it, local employment, tax revenue, and other economic benefits. This Article’s equity inquiry
renders no judgment on the validity of such reasoning, simply seeks to draw attention to the
resulting cross-subsidization to allow readers to form their own opinion. See also supra
Section I.C.
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generators,131 has allowed the growing share of renewable power generators to push
older, higher-cost—and frequently higher-emitting—generators out of the market.
Between 2008 and 2013, this indirect program benefit has helped to reduce
wholesale electricity prices by over 50 percent.132
On the negative side, the German policymaker has privileged renewables by
exempting them from the forecast and balancing responsibilities of forward power
markets.133 In these markets, generators typically offer to supply electricity to the
system operator for five-minute intervals on a day-ahead basis.134 The following day,
when the relevant five-minute window opens, the generator has to deliver the
promised amount of electricity or else compensate the system operator under their
imbalance settlement for balancing services the latter uses to cover for the
generator’s lack of performance under their contract. As a concession to their
weather-dependency and the resulting output intermittency of solar and wind
generators, this exemption made sense early on when weather data and forecast
models were lacking and the overall market share of these intermittent generators
was still small.135
As forecasts have improved and market shares have grown, however, such
exemption privileges are no longer required, especially for utility-scale installations.
Otherwise, these generators externalize the cost of their intermittency with
ratepayers picking up the tab for balancing services provided by other generators
filling in for no-show renewables. Over the course of four years, Germany saw a
near fivefold increase in network operator requests to power plant operators to adjust
their output to maintain grid stability from 209 requests in 2010 to 1,009 requests in
2013.136 Recently, Germany has begun to offer additional incentives for renewable
131

See HANS POSER ET AL., FINADVICE, DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION OF
RENEWABLE ENERGY: LESSONS LEARNED FROM GERMANY 37 (2014), https://docs.windwatch.org/germany-lessons-learned-0714.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQZ8-L3KP] (“[T]he offer
curve of a power market is determined by the marginal costs in ascending order of the
available power sources. This is the so-called merit order.”); see also Emily Hammond &
David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141, 154
(2016) (“[W]hen the grid operator dispatches power from individual electric generating
facilities to the grid, it does so on a least-cost basis.”).
132
See POSER ET AL., supra note 131, at 3–4, 37–38; see also EDITH BAYER, AGORA
ENERGIEWENDE, REPORT ON THE GERMAN POWER SYSTEM 22 (2015), http://www.agoraenergiewende.de/fileadmin/downloads/publikationen/CountryProfiles/Agora_CP_Germany
_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX3N-UY9W].
133
For an introduction to the architecture of the electricity market, see Corinna
Klessmann et al., Pros and Cons of Exposing Renewables to Electricity Market Risks—A
Comparison of the Market Integration Approaches in Germany, Spain, and the UK, 36
ENERGY POL’Y 3646, 3647 (2008).
134
Id.
135
See Mormann, Renewables Revolution, supra note 68, at 957 (calling for exemptions
from forecast and balancing responsibilities for intermittent renewables early in the
innovation cycle).
136
See Julia Mengewein, German Utilities Bail Out Electric Grid at Wind’s Mercy,
BLOOMBERG (July 25, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-
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power generators to enter—and play by the rules of—the country’s wholesale power
markets.137 In the meantime, however, the existing renewables fleet continues to
enjoy carte blanche—incurring indirect program costs borne by ratepayers who have
to pay for costly balancing services.
B. Tender Regimes – Case Study Ireland
As one of the policy’s earliest adopters, Ireland’s experience with competitive
tenders to promote renewable energy has become the subject of intense study by
scholars around the world.138 Limited supply of indigenous fuel resources, a
peripheral location restricting electricity imports from the rest of Europe, and the
presence of high-quality wind resources led Irish policymakers to adopt the
Alternative Energy Requirement (AER) to accelerate the deployment of
renewables. 139 During the course of six bidding rounds held over a period of ten
years, renewable energy projects with a total nameplate capacity of 1,130 megawatts
(MW) were awarded long-term power purchase agreements.140 In terms of policy
equity, Ireland’s AER tender regime matches direct costs and benefits moderately
but receives poor marks for its treatment of indirect costs.
The Irish tender regime has a mixed track record when it comes to the scope of
economic benefits it creates. The AER earns points for its sensitivity to the varied
generation cost profiles of different renewable energy technologies, requiring
bidders to compete only within the same technology strand.141 The first AER
auction, for example, solicited separate bids for specified amounts of capacity to be
provided by wind, hydro, biomass, and cogeneration, respectively.142 Ireland’s
tender regime further differentiates between renewable power projects based on their
size, carving out, for example, separate bidding areas for small- and large-scale wind
projects.143
24/german-utilities-bail-out-electric-grid-at-wind-s-mercy [https://perma.cc/D2SL-SKPR]
(reporting data for Tennet TSO, Germany’s second-largest grid operator).
137
See MATT CROUCHER ET AL., AZ SMART, MARKET-BASED INCENTIVES 23–29
(2010).
138
See, e.g., SIMONE STEINHILBER, AUCTIONS FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY SUPPORT IN
IRELAND: INSTRUMENTS AND LESSONS LEARNT (2016); Huber et al., supra note 90; BRIAN
P. Ó GALLACHÓIR ET AL., WIND ENERGY POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN IRELAND – A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS (2002); RYAN WISER, BERKELY LAB & CLEAN ENERGY GROUP, THE U.K. NFFO
AND IRELAND AER COMPETITIVE BIDDING SYSTEMS (2002).
139
See CROUCHER ET AL., supra note 137, at 52; Ó GALLACHÓIR ET AL., supra note 138.
140
See H.J. DE VRIES ET AL., ENERGY RESEARCH CTR. OF THE NETHERLANDS,
RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY POLICIES IN EUROPE 61 (2003); CROUCHER ET AL., supra note
137, at 55. From an efficacy perspective, the main criticism of Ireland’s AER is that only
about a third of all contracted capacity was actually installed by 2015. See STEINHILBER,
supra note 138, at 11.
141
See STEINHILBER, supra note 138, at 12.
142
See DE VRIES ET AL., supra note 140, at 57–58; CROUCHER ET AL., supra note 137,
at 55.
143
See DE VRIES ET AL., supra note 140, at 57–58.
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The AER’s sensitivity to generation technology and size, however, is largely
outweighed by its inability to mobilize a wider range of bidders. The high up-front
cost required to prepare a competitive bid and the uncertainty of its eventual pay-off
discourage the vast majority of potential bidders. Only institutional actors or
incumbent utilities—who possess sufficient overhead capacity and industry-specific
knowledge—tend to be willing to assume the risk of preparing and submitting a
costly but ultimately unsuccessful bid. The tender procedure itself has been
characterized as “a bureaucratic process with several application deadlines which
create busy periods for those involved . . . and therefore staffing and time
management problems.” 144 In the case of Ireland’s AER, these tender-typical policy
challenges are exacerbated by the fact that auctions took place at irregular intervals
with constantly changing technology preferences leaving potential bidders with
little, if any, ability to plan ahead.145 A lack of transparency resulting from the
classification of contract prices awarded under the AER as commercially sensitive
information reduces incentives for new market entrants.146
Ireland’s AER receives moderate marks for matching direct costs and benefits.
The national utility company recovers the extra costs incurred under its tender
awards through a Public Service Obligation levy.147 Unlike Germany’s feed-in tariff
levy that, in the interest of international economic competitiveness, exempts energyintensive industrial electricity customers, the Irish levy applies without exemption
spreading the financial burden across all ratepayers.148 Even in the wake of growing
unrest over the economic impact of Brexit, Irish regulators remain steadfast in their
refusal to lower the levy for corporate electricity customers.149
The AER misses a higher policy equity rating, however, because the levy’s
administration as a flat rate—largely decoupled from a ratepayer’s overall electricity
consumption150—gives it the effect of a regressive tax that imposes a
disproportionately large burden on low-income ratepayers. In fact, higher-volume
electricity customers might well be able to recover part, or even all, of their flat rate
levy through reductions in volumetric electricity rates thanks to the merit-order
effect of AER-deployed renewables in the wholesale market.151 This disparity is all
144

Catherine Mitchell, The Renewables NFFO—A Review, 23 ENERGY POL’Y 1077,
1086 (1995).
145
See STEINHILBER, supra note 138, at 12.
146
Id. at 13.
147
See SHRUTI SHUKLA & STEVE SAWYER, INTERNATIONAL RENEABLE ENERGY
AGENCY, 30 YEARS OF POLICIES FOR WIND ENERGY: LESSONS FROM 12 WIND ENERGY
MARKETS 99 (2012).
148
See COMM’N FOR ENERGY REG., PUBLIC SERVICE OBLIGATION LEVY 2016/17, at 4
(2016).
149
Id. at 18–20.
150
The Public Service Obligation levy distinguishes between three different classes of
customers—households, small commercial, and medium to large electricity customers. Id. at
4–5.
151
See supra note 129 and accompanying text; see also DE VRIES ET AL., supra note
140, at 57–58.
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the more problematic considering that the levy’s flat-rate structure hits those hardest
who, for the reasons outlined above,152 are least likely to partake in the economic
benefits created by Ireland’s tender regime.
The AER performs poorly in terms of indirect costs and benefits. From a gridmanagement perspective, Ireland’s tender regime engenders indirect costs and
benefits similar to those caused by Germany’s feed-in tariffs. On the positive side,
as the tender regime has increased the market share of renewable energy generation,
the same merit-order effect observed in Germany153 has helped drive down prices in
the Irish wholesale market for electricity.154 On the negative side, Ireland, like
Germany, grants dispatch priority to all renewable energy generation at the expense
of conventional power plants.155
Unlike Germany, the Irish regulator requires newer wind and other variable
renewable power generators to assume certain forecast and balancing
responsibilities that are commonplace for conventional power plants, including
imbalance settlement payments.156 Older renewable generators with intermittent
output, including the majority of those developed under the AER regime, however,
remain exempt from forecast and balancing responsibilities.157 The latter are further
privileged vis-à-vis the former insofar as they are less likely to be subject to
curtailment in the event of transmission bottlenecks and other grid constraints.158
The privileges afforded to AER generators might have seemed reasonable at the time
to help a fledgling industry. In light of dramatically improved forecast accuracy and
remote-control capacity for wind and other weather-dependent generators, they are,
however, difficult to justify today. The continuing preferential treatment for AER
generators imposes indirect costs on Irish ratepayers as conventional power plants
but also newer renewable generators pass on the costs for their relatively greater
balancing responsibilities to bring up the slack caused by exempt legacy generators.
Beyond grid management and operations, the lack of a reliable auction schedule
and the resulting stop-and-go nature of the Irish tender regime further imposed
undue hardship on spatial planning and permitting agencies that have found
themselves inundated with waves of applications at unpredictable intervals.159
152

See DE VRIES ET AL, supra note 140, at 57–58; Mitchell, supra note 144, at 1086 and
accompanying text.
153
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
154
See COMM’N FOR ENERGY REG., supra note 148, at 23–24 .
155
See EIRGRID & SONNI GROUP, ANNUAL RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSTRAINT AND
CURTAILMENT REPORT 2016 (2017).
156
See COMM’N FOR ENERGY REG., THE SINGLE ELECTRICITY MARKET (SEM)
TRADING AND SETTLEMENT CODE 25 (2017) (summarizing the regulatory treatment of
Variable Price Taker Generator Units).
157
Id. at 128 (describing the regulatory treatment of Autonomous Generator Units).
158
See EIRGRID & SONNI GROUP, supra note 155, at 18.
159
See, e.g., STEINHILBER, supra note 138, at 12 (mourning the “lack of coordination
between grid connection, permitting procedures, and the auctioning process”); Ó
GALLACHÓIR ET AL., supra note 138 (reporting that the lack of a reliable auction schedule
caused developers to withhold planning applications and development work).
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C. Net Energy Metering – Case Study United States
Net energy metering policies, adopted by over forty states,160 have emerged as
the most common tool to remunerate the power output of solar and other distributed
generation assets.161 Across the country, net metering programs have recently come
under attack by special interest groups.162 Led by electric utilities, opponents argue
that net metering enables wealthy homeowners with rooftop solar to effectively stop
paying for vital network maintenance and upgrades despite using the grid to supply
electricity to their homes when their solar panels do not produce enough energy to
meet the homeowner’s demand.163 A closer look at the equity of state net metering
programs suggests that the current batch of policies does, indeed, leave room for
improvement. The prevailing net metering model164 performs well in terms of
matching indirect costs and benefits but provides a poor match between direct costs
and benefits.
Net metering programs generally create economic opportunities open to a wide
range of ratepayers. Pre-determined remuneration rates for excess generation and
the local utility or network operator’s obligation to allow customers to net meter
within the limits of a state’s capacity cap minimize transaction costs. As price-based
policy tools, net metering programs do not require participants to trade in the various
electricity markets and, hence, offer good revenue certainty. The primary barrier to
accessing the economic opportunities provided by net metering policies lies in the
general requirement that participating ratepayers own the real estate that is the site
of their distributed generation assets.165 The relatively high upfront expenditures and
160

Revesz & Unel, supra note 96, at 47.
See id. at 59.
162
See, e.g., Hiroko Tabuchi, Rooftop Solar Dims Under Pressure from Utility
Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/08/climate/rooftop
-solar-panels-tax-credits-utility-companies-lobbying.html [https://perma.cc/T4UX-KRPD];
Diane Cardwell, Solar Panel Payments Set Off a Fairness Debate, N.Y. TIMES (June 4,
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/05/business/solar-payments-set-off-a-fairnessdebate.html [https://perma.cc/3UH7-LMZF].
163
For a thoughtful summary and critique of the various arguments leveled against net
energy metering programs, see Rule, supra note 17, at 12–47. See also Charles E. Bayless,
Piggybacking on the Grid: Why Net Energy Metering is Unfair and Inefficient, PUB. UTIL.
FORT. 38 (2015) (offering a strong critique of net metering customers’ free riding on the
electric grid at the expense of utilities and other ratepayers).
164
This article’s equity assessment of net metering policies is based on a stylized model
that reflects the most prevailing design features across state policies, including remuneration
at full retail rates, the ability to carry over excess credits, and a cap on the permissible size
of individual net-metered distributed generation facilities, among others. For a more detailed
survey of the various design features of state net metering policies, see Revesz & Unel, supra
note 96, at 59–64.
165
A growing number of states allow their citizens to participate in community solar
programs that enable ratepayers to engage in virtual net metering, crediting their share of
generation from an off-site facility against the ratepayers’ on-site consumption. See, e.g.,
INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, FREEING THE GRID 2013: BEST PRACTICES IN
161
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overhead costs required to deploy solar and other distributed generation assets
further limit the practical appeal of net metering policies to higher-consumption
households.166
The direct costs imposed by net metering policies are harder to quantify than
those of other policies. At a glance, one might well assume that ratepayers who use
customer-sited distributed generation to reduce their net demand for electricity from
the grid in exchange for a lower utility bill impose no costs on others. After all,
allowing a ratepayer to run her meter backwards effectively remunerates her on-site
generation at the local retail rate for electric power.167 In a perfectly competitive
market, where the clearing price equals marginal cost, the retail rate would reflect
the cost that the local utility would have incurred to provide the energy now selfgenerated by its customer.168 In this perfectly competitive scenario, remunerating the
customer’s on-site energy production at the retail rate would be cost-neutral for the
utility who would have incurred generation costs tantamount to the retail revenue it
foregoes by virtue of net metering.
In reality, however, retail electricity rates do not reflect the electricity
providers’ marginal cost of production. In addition to the variable cost of generation,
retail rates also include charges designed to cover the fixed costs associated with
transmission and distribution, among other services.169 Even though transmission,
distribution, ancillary services, and other fixed costs account for over 50 percent of
the average electricity bill, expressly noted fixed charges make up less than 10
percent of the total.170 The vast majority of fixed costs is folded into volumetric retail
rates and, hence, inefficiently tied to a ratepayer’s actual electricity usage. As net
metering enables customers to reduce their net consumption of utility-provided
electricity, they avoid paying volumetric rates. At the same time, they also stop
paying for much of the network-related costs that the utility incurs for their
continued reliance on the grid as a source of back-up power and a receptacle for their
excess generation.171 To be clear, net metered distributed generation assets have the
STATE NET METERING POLICIES AND INTERCONNECTION PROCEDURES 20–21 (describing the
mechanics and benefits of community shared renewables).
166
See also Revesz & Unel, supra note 96, at 76 (“[B]ecause of the expenses associated
with owning or leasing solar panels and a greater incentive among high-consumption
households to pursue distributed generation as a means of lowering utility bills, net metering
is often disproportionately concentrated among wealthier customers”).
167
See, e.g., EDISON ELEC. INST., SOLAR ENERGY AND NET METERING 1–2 (2016).
168
For further information on the underlying concept of “avoided cost” and its
regulatory treatment, see 16 U.S.C. § 824a–3(b). See also Steven R. Miles, Full-Avoided
Cost Pricing Under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act: “Just and Reasonable” to
Electric Consumers?, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1269 (1984).
169
For an instructive example of how retail electricity rates are set in regulated markets
using cost-of-service regulation, see FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 60–64 (3rd ed. 2015).
170
See Revesz & Unel, supra note 96, at 72.
171
See, e.g., AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL, REFORMING NET METERING:
PROVIDING A BRIGHT AND EQUITABLE FUTURE 1 (2014) (noting that “distributed generation
technologies rely extensively upon the electric grid to operate efficiently”); Bayless, supra
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potential to reduce the local utility’s network-related expenditures,172 but these cost
savings and other network benefits can be hard to quantify and are more attenuated,
placing them among net metering’s more indirect benefits discussed below.
The prevailing practice of recovering fixed costs primarily through
consumption-dependent, volumetric rates leads to cost shifting among customer
groups when one group reduces its (net) consumption, be it through energy
efficiency upgrades, behavioral changes, or net metering. Under the current model,
a utility no longer able to recover its fixed costs from one group needs to raise its
volumetric retail rates to make up for the shortfall. While the adjusted rate, in theory,
applies to all customers alike, the increase imposes a disproportionately large burden
on those customers whose continued exclusive reliance on utility-provided power
requires them to pay a significant amount of volumetric charges.173 As a result,
customers who participate in and benefit from net metering programs contribute the
least, if anything, to the costs imposed by their selective reliance on the electric grid.
While the precise magnitude of this cost shifting effect varies by jurisdiction and
remains in dispute, recent studies suggest that the proliferation of net metered
distributed generation assets imposes a significant financial burden on other
ratepayers. 174 This cost shifting dynamic earns net metering policies a poor rating
for their matching of direct costs and benefits.
Net energy metering policies perform well when it comes to matching indirect
costs and benefits. Customer-sited distributed generation provides a variety of
indirect benefits to the grid and the broader pool of electricity market participants.
Like any other policy that promotes the deployment of clean energy technologies
with effective dispatch priority, net metering’s merit-order effect175 helps drive
down wholesale market prices by pushing more expensive plants out of the market,
to the benefit of all ratepayers. These grid-wide cost savings are especially
prominent in hot climates where distributed solar generation can help shave peak

note 163, at 39–40 (criticizing the reality that net metering customers may have reached a
“net zero” threshold on energy for themselves but do so at the expense of a large net negative
on grid services).
172
For a thoughtful discussion of these benefits and their sensitivity to local conditions,
see, e.g., GALEN BARBOSE, LAWRENCE BERKELY NAT’L L AB., PUTTING THE POTENTIAL
RATE IMPACTS OF DISTRIBUTED SOLAR INTO CONTEXT (2017).
173
See AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL, supra note 171, at 8–11 (describing
how net metering ratepayers shift the cost burden to other ratepayers).
174
New York utilities, for example, suggest that shifted costs might soon exceed $300
million annually. Joint Utilities Response to Staff’s Information Request, Case 15-E-0751,
at 2 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, In the Matter of the Value of Distributed Energy Resources,
June 10, 2016). California’s utility regulators expect up to $370 million in fixed costs to be
shifted to non-net-metered ratepayers by 2020. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, CALIFORNIA NET
ENERGY METERING RATEPAYER IMPACTS EVALUATION 6 (2013).
175
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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demand during mid-day driven by the need for air conditioning, thereby eliminating
the need for inefficient and costly peaker plants.176
As discussed earlier, net metered distributed generation also provides value to
the transmission and distribution systems.177 A customer’s consumption of her selfgenerated power, for example, eliminates the need to deliver electricity to her
through a congested and, hence, less efficient grid and may allow for postponing
otherwise necessary network upgrades.178 When a net metered customer’s excess
generation is consumed locally, electricity needs to travel significantly shorter
distances than from the utility’s generation assets that are often sited well outside
load centers.179 With line losses accounting for up to 8 percent of a utility’s total
generation output, the ability of net metering policies to bring generation and
consumption closer together offers significant efficiency benefits that translate to
cost savings for all ratepayers.180
Net metered distributed generation can further help improve the electric grid’s
resiliency so as to avoid or minimize power outages during extraordinary or
hazardous events.181 Combined with smart inverters, microgrids, and energy storage,
distributed generation can fill in for utility-scale generation during extreme weather
events thereby reducing the frequency and severity of weather-induced service
interruptions responsible for tens of billions of dollars in economic losses every year
in the United States alone.182
The many indirect benefits that net metering policies generate for the electric
grid and its stakeholders are not free. The two-way traffic of electricity required to
harness the resiliency improvements, congestion relief, and other benefits of
distributed generation, for example, requires significant upgrades to a network
176

See also Revesz & Unel, supra note 96, at 79 (“Avoided energy benefits can be
especially significant if distributed energy resources help avoid generation from costlier peak
plants.”).
177
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
178
See Revesz & Unel, supra note 96, at 73. The precise value of these benefits is
difficult to quantify and varies based on seasonal and diurnal grid demand and distributed
generation output patterns.
179
See also Joel B. Eisen & Felix Mormann, Free Trade in Electric Power, 2018 UTAH
L. REV. 49, 59–60 (describing how solar and other non-polluting generation technologies
can be sited closer to consumers than traditional utility-scale thermal power plants, yielding
significant benefits to the transmission and distribution systems).
180
See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF DISTRIBUTED
GENERATION AND RATE-RELATED ISSUES THAT MAY IMPEDE THEIR EXPANSION 3–18
(2007).
181
See MILES KEOGH & CHRISTINA CODY, NAT’L ASS’N OF REG. UTIL. COMM’RS,
RESILIENCE IN REGULATED UTILS. 1 (2013) (offering an industry-wide definition of
resiliency) [https://perma.cc/9F9N-BCYU].
182
See NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., DISTRIBUTED SOLAR PV FOR ELECTRICITY
SYSTEM RESILIENCY 1 (2014). While there is no universally accepted methodology for
quantifying the resiliency benefits of distributed generation, studies suggest a monetary value
of $0.010 to $0.025 per kWh of distributed power generation. See Revesz & Unel, supra
note 96, at 81.
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historically designed for the mono-directional flow of electrons from utility-scale
power plants to consumers.183
The peak-shaving benefits associated with net metered distributed generation
also come at a cost. As illustrated by the (in)famous California duck curve, solar and
other weather-dependent distributed resources require fast-ramping back-up power
to maintain the grid’s delicate balance between demand and supply.184 As net
metering and distributed generation continue to proliferate, conventional plants will
increasingly have to ramp down during the day and stand by to, quickly, ramp up in
the event of cloud cover or other adverse weather conditions and, of course, as the
sun sets. This ramping up and down, or cycling, increases the average operating
costs of affected plants and, ultimately, requires additional compensation from
utilities and their ratepayers.185 To be sure, all of the policies discussed here require
back-up power to make up for variations in the output from solar, wind, and other
intermittent renewables. Net metering policies, however, pose a particularly iffy
challenge for network operators because the behind-the-meter location of net
metered distributed generation assets exacerbates the difficulty in predicting and
managing their net impact on grid demand.186
D. Tax Credits – Case Study United States
Federal tax credits for clean energy provide a poor match between direct
program costs and benefits, and score poorly on indirect costs and benefits, too. This
overall poor report card for the primary federal policy instrument to support solar,
wind, and other renewables may come as a surprise to some considering the strong
support for federal tax breaks within the renewable energy industry.187 The scholarly
literature, however, has long critiqued tax credit support for clean energy as “the rich
man’s feed-in tariff.”188
183

See Eisen & Mormann, supra note 179, at 61 (explaining how the electric grid’s
current architecture, frequently dating back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century,
is poorly adapted to accommodate and harness the many benefits offered by distributed
generation); Revesz & Unel, supra note 96, at 83 (discussing the additional strains that bidirectional flow of electricity imposes on the grid).
184
See, e.g., CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, WHAT THE DUCK CURVE TELLS US ABOUT
MANAGING A GREEN GRID 3 (2013), http://www.caiso.com/Documents/ FlexibleResources
HelpRenewables_FastFacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/LUS5-47VU].
185
See MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRIC GRID 64 (2011).
186
See, e.g., Mormann et al., supra note 8, at 68–69 (noting the California grid
operator’s difficulty in keeping track of distributed solar facilities that are customer-owned
and located behind the meter).
187
See, e.g., Tax Policy, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, https://www.awea.org/policy-andissues/tax-policy [https://perma.cc/X223-U8NX]; Solar Investment Tax Credit, SOLAR
ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASS’N, http://www.seia.org/policy/finance-tax/solar-investment-taxcredit [https://perma.cc/FK65-4AYR].
188
David Toke, Are Green Electricity Certificates the Way Forward for Renewable
Energy? An Evaluation of the United Kingdom’s Renewables Obligation in the Context of
International Comparisons, 23 ENV’T & PLANNING C. GOV’T & POL’Y 361, 368 (2005).
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Federal tax credits score poorly in terms of terms of matching direct costs and
benefits because they create economic opportunities only for a small group of banks,
financial firms, and other highly profitable corporations.189 This limited economic
appeal is due to the mismatch between tax credits’ inherent profitability
requirements and the revenue profile of renewable power projects.190 Many project
developers lack the quintessential requirement to benefit from federal tax breaks—
a tax bill that is high enough to offset and thereby realize the full and immediate
monetary value of tax credits.191 Renewable power plants may not incur the same
fuel costs as their fossil fuel counterparts, but they require relatively greater up-front
capital expenditures for planning, construction, and equipment.192 It frequently takes
ten or more years before a renewable power project has recovered these expenditures
and begins to generate the necessary profits and tax liability to use its tax credits.193
To be sure, the project developer could simply carry forward her tax credits year
after year until her tax bill eventually is high enough, but, in the case of a standalone
wind project, for example, this lack of current tax liabilities would cost her up to
two-thirds of the net present value of her project’s tax benefits.194

189
Historically, fewer than two dozen highly profitable and sophisticated entities—
mostly large banks, insurance companies, and other financial firms—have been willing and
able to support renewable energy projects through their tax equity investments. See
BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., REASSESSING RENEWABLE ENERGY SUBSIDIES—ISSUE BRIEF 10
(2011).
190
See Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits, supra note 18, at 303.
191
See Bolinger et al., supra note 100, at 6804; STEVE CORNELI, U.S. PARTNERSHIP FOR
RENEWABLE ENERGY FIN., CLEAN ENERGY AND TAX REFORM: HOW TAX POLICY CAN HELP
RENEWABLE ENERGY CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC GROWTH, ENERGY SECURITY AND A
BALANCED BUDGET 13 (2012); BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., supra note 189, at 9; MINTZ LEVIN
& GTM RESEARCH, RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECT FINANCE IN THE U.S.: 2010–2013
OVERVIEW AND FUTURE OUTLOOK (2012), http://www.mintz.com/DesktopModules/Bring
2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?EntryId=231&PortalId=0&DownloadMethod=attachment
[https://perma.cc/L9AK-NLJ2]; see also JOHN P. HARPER ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY
NAT’L LAB., WIND PROJECT FINANCING STRUCTURES: A REVIEW & COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS (2007), http://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/REPORT%20lbnl%20-%2063434.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CA87-58QD] (noting that only a handful of large developers are able to
make use of the federal tax credits).
192
See HARPER ET AL., supra note 191, at i (comparing up-front capital expenditures
relative to generation capacity).
193
See PHILIP BROWN & MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41635,
ARRA SECTION 1603 GRANTS IN LIEU OF TAX CREDITS FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY:
OVERVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND POLICY OPTIONS 8 (2011). For a wind project, for example, it
takes approximately twelve years to fully work through net operating losses from
depreciation deductions before the project even begins to generate the taxable income
required to be able to self-monetize available tax credits. Bolinger et al., supra note 100, at
17.
194
UDAY VARADARAJAN ET AL., CLIMATE POLICY INITIATIVE, SUPPORTING
RENEWABLES WHILE SAVING TAXPAYERS MONEY 1, 4 (2012).
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Enter the “tax equity”195 investor whose participation enables the developer to
monetize the project’s tax credits in a timely fashion.196 Such tax equity investment
effectively allows a renewable energy project to sell the tax credits that the project
itself cannot presently monetize against its own income to the tax equity investor.197
But tax equity investors are few and far between—and they exploit their exclusivity
status to exact higher rates of return than the risk profile of their involvement would
normally warrant.198 The tax equity market’s cyclical nature further reduces the
value of tax credits during economic downturns when developers need them most.199
To make matters worse, the tax code renders tax equity for renewable energy a
highly illiquid investment thereby impeding the formation of secondary markets that
would allow developers to refinance their projects in the near to medium term.200 In
addition, participation of a tax equity investor in renewable power projects requires
complex and costly deal structures that drive up transaction costs.201 The need to

195

Tax equity, not to be confused with the concept of equity as used elsewhere in this
Article, is a hybrid investment position that combines characteristics of conventional debt
and equity stakes. Like traditional equity, tax equity bears the ultimate performance risk of
a project. Like debt, tax equity receives preferential treatment regarding project cash flows.
These include positive cash flows such as payments under a power purchase agreement with
a local utility or other off-taker and, most importantly, negative cash flows in the form of tax
credits and other benefits that the tax equity investor can use to offset her tax liabilities
outside of the project. See, e.g., BROWN & SHERLOCK, supra note 193, at 17–19; CORNELI,
supra note 191, at 13; BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., supra note 189, at 9.
196
See, e.g., ETHAN ZINDLER & TYLER TRINGAS, BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN.,
CASH IS KING: SHORTCOMINGS OF US TAX CREDITS IN SUBSIDIZING RENEWABLES 2 (2009).
197
See, generally, Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits, supra note 18, at 325–26.
198
See BROWN & SHERLOCK, supra note 193, at 18; HARPER ET AL., supra note 191,
at v; MINTZ LEVIN & GTM RESEARCH, supra note 191, at 8; see also Mormann, Beyond Tax
Credits, supra note 18, at 326–27 (pointing to higher-quality project development as a
positive side effect of competition among developers for a spot at the tax equity trough).
199
See, e.g., MINTZ LEVIN & GTM RESEARCH, supra note 191, at 3 (“Macro-trends in
tax equity financing . . . are highly correlated to the financial health of a limited number of
large financial institutions.”).
200
The investment tax credit for solar and other renewable projects, for instance,
becomes available in full in the year that the facility is placed into service. But the credit
actually takes five years to linearly vest in its entirety requiring the tax equity investor to
hold on to her stake in the project for at least five years in order to realize the tax credit’s full
value. Should the investor decide to pull out of the project earlier, say after three years, the
non-vested portion of her tax credit, in this case 40 percent, would be subject to recapture
and the associated tax savings would need to be paid back to the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS). See 26 U.S.C. § 50(a)(1)(B) (2018).
201
The tax code’s general prohibition of trafficking in tax credits and other tax attributes
according to 26 U.S.C. § 382 (2012) rules out a straight-forward sale of these attributes and,
instead, requires inventive—and costly—deal structures in order to legally assign what
would otherwise be the developer’s tax benefits to the tax equity investor. The three main
tax equity structures in use today are the partnership flip, the sale-leaseback, and the inverted
lease. DIPA SHARIF ET AL., BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN., THE RETURN – AND RETURNS –
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bring in a tax equity investor, finally, limits a developer’s ability to raise project
capital from other, more cost-efficient sources as tax equity often forestalls less
expensive debt financing.202
In the end, even when bringing in a tax equity investor, renewable energy
developers can realize no more than two-thirds of the value of their project’s tax
benefits.203 The highly limited economic appeal of federal tax credits for renewables,
therefore, bodes ill not only for the policy’s equity and but also for its cost
efficiency. 204
The poor equity rating of federal tax credits is driven by the de facto reservation
of direct program benefits to a small group of tax equity investors while funding for
these credits comes out of the U.S. Treasury’s general tax revenue thereby spreading
the cost across all taxpayers. The enormous discrepancy between this quasisocialization of costs and the oligopolization of economic opportunities flies in the
face of commensurately matching costs and benefits as required under this Article’s
equity framework.
In terms of indirect costs and benefits, federal tax credits for renewables rate
poorly due to their disruptive effect on wholesale electricity markets. On the positive
side, tax-credit-funded renewable power capacity has helped reduce wholesale
market clearing prices thanks to the same merit-order effect discussed above.205 The
production tax credit has, however, forced network operators to increasingly send
out negative price signals to encourage generators to ramp down their power output
during times of low demand—at the expense of other, especially non-wind,
generators. To be sure, negative price signals predate the Energy Policy Act of 1992
that created the production tax credit, but they have become much more frequent
since. That is because wind power generators earn production tax credits only for
electricity they generate and feed into the grid for sale to a third party.206 The latter
requirement has had a profound effect on wholesale electricity markets. Historically,
network operators could effectively signal to power plants that they should decrease
their output, or ramp down, by gradually reducing the offer price near or, in some
cases, to zero. With no fuel requirement to drive marginal costs and a production tax
credit tied to power production and sales, however, wind generators continue to
produce and feed power into the grid unless and until prices go so far below zero
OF TAX EQUITY FOR US RENEWABLE PROJECTS 10–15 (2011) (offering a concise comparison

across all three tax equity structures).
202
Tax equity investors are wary of losing their preferred access to project cash flows
to lenders. See supra note 195 (describing the preferred access to project cash flows for tax
equity investors). In addition, the complex deal structures required for tax equity deals
preclude purely debt-financed projects. See Chadbourne & Parke LLP, supra note 103,
at 34–35 (describing how debt financing would take over if tax credits were replaced with
direct cash subsidies).
203
See VARADARAJAN ET AL., supra note 194, at 4.
204
See Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits, supra note 18, at 315; VARADARAJAN ET AL.,
supra note 194, at 4 .
205
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
206
See 26 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2)(B) (2018).
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that they eat up all of their tax credits. As a result, where network operators used to
send a zero-price signal, in wind-rich markets they now have to use a negative price
signal actually penalizing other generators who may struggle to ramp down their
output quickly enough at times of low demand.207 These negative price signals
impose harsh burdens on generators without tax credits, such as coal power plants
who take longer than others to ramp down and, ultimately pay a penalty in the
amount of negative pricing required to persuade wind generators and other recipients
of production tax credits that they should reduce their output to maintain the electric
grid’s delicate balance between demand and supply.208
E. Renewable Portfolio Standards – Case Study United States
Renewable portfolio standards—adopted by twenty-nine states, three U.S.
territories, and the District of Columbia—have evolved as one of the principal
drivers of clean energy deployment in the United States. Minor differences across
state policies notwithstanding,209 the prevailing model of renewable portfolio
standards receives moderate equity marks in terms of direct costs and benefits due
to the limited pool of economic beneficiaries compared to the allocation of
procurement costs across all ratepayers. They earn excellent marks, however,
regarding indirect costs and benefits thanks to the planning certainty they afford to
network operators and their role as a potential gateway policy for cap-and-trade
regimes. How is it that one of the most widely adopted and longest-standing clean
energy policies in the United States is not more equitable in its distribution of direct
costs and benefits? The answer to this question lies in the considerable revenue
uncertainty and transaction costs that renewable portfolio standards impose on
generators and their investors.
Unlike feed-in tariffs and other price-based policies that guarantee a specific
rate for renewable electricity, portfolio standards rely on the fluctuating market
forces of demand and supply to determine the ultimate level of remuneration for
207

See, e.g., FRANK HUNTOWSKI, AARON PATTERSON & MICHAEL SCHNITZER, THE
NORTHBRIDGE GROUP, NEGATIVE ELECTRICITY PRICES AND THE PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT
12 fig. 8 (2012), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2012/Negative_Electricity_Prices
_and_the_Production_Tax_Credit_0912.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3TT-JQX8]; id. at 12
(“Negative prices are most prevalent when wind output is highest relative to overall demand,
such as during the overnight hours in the spring and fall months when wind output is high
but demand is relatively low and less power is needed.”).
208
Some may consider the prevalence of negative price signals in wind-rich markets
and their detrimental impact on conventional generators a feature rather than a bug. After all,
the stated policy goal of tax incentives for clean energy is to increase the market share of
solar, wind, and other low-carbon renewables—at the expense of coal and other incumbents.
As before, see supra note 130, this Article’s equity inquiry does not pass judgment on the
strategic value of such policy characteristics but merely seeks to bring them to the fore so
that readers may from their own opinion. See supra Section I.C.
209
For an instructive overview of differences in design and implementation across state
renewable portfolio standards, see Davies, supra note 109, at 1398–1403 (comparing
resource eligibility, REC shelf life, and other key features across state policies).
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renewable power. 210 In fact, portfolio standard policies often require renewable
generators to trade on not one but two separate markets—the wholesale electricity
market for selling their power output and the REC market for selling their credits.211
As a result, generators find themselves exposed to the price risk of two distinct
markets, each with its own set of risks and rules. Day-ahead trading in wholesale
electricity markets, for instance, may require weather-dependent solar or wind
generators to submit a bid for power they may prove unable to supply when called
upon the next day.212 On the REC side, fragmented and often illiquid markets may
expose generators to extreme trading volatility as illustrated by geographic price
fluctuations ranging from $1.75 in California to $35.00 in New England for a credit
issued for 1 MWh of wind energy.213 Within a one-year period, temporal price
fluctuations have been reported to range from $6.00 to nearly $40.00 for 1 MWh
worth of Connecticut RECs.214
A renewable portfolio standard’s inherent requirement that eligible generators
participate in two separate markets not only increases their overall exposure to
market risk but also drives up associated transaction costs. In contrast to a feed-in
tariff or tender regime, portfolio standards require renewable generators to negotiate
and execute one or more power purchase agreements to sell their output.215 Together,
the heightened market risks and transaction costs impose significant barriers to
access to the economic opportunities created under renewable portfolio standards.
This exclusivity has led some to characterize portfolio standards as “‘big
corporation’ policies” with “neutral or negative effects on smaller, entrepreneurial
firms.”216 To be sure, firms such as SolarCity, Sungevity, or SunRun offer to assume
some of the market risks and manage the necessary transactions on behalf of
residential and other, smaller-scale generators, but these intermediaries charge a fee
for their involvement that reduces the overall economic upside to generators.217
While not quite as exclusive as tax credits, renewable portfolio standards suffer from
a similarly limited access to the policy’s economic benefits.

210

See supra notes 106–109 and accompanying text.
See Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, supra note 14, at 1660.
212
See Klessmann et al., supra note 133, at 3647.
213
See Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Congress Got it Wrong: The Case
for a National Renewable Portfolio Standard and Implications for Policy, 3 ENVTL. &
ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 85, 105 (2008).
214
See Ryan Wiser et al., The Experience with Renewable Portfolio Standards in the
United States, 20 ELECTRICITY J. 8, 16 (2007).
215
See Mormann, Investor Appeal of Renewable Energy, supra note 16, at 713.
216
Mary Jean Bürer & Rolf Wüstenhagen, Which Renewable Energy Policy Is a
Venture Capitalist’s Best Friend? Empirical Evidence from a Survey of International
Cleantech Investors, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 4997, 5005 (2009).
217
See, e.g., KATHARINE KOLLINS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SOLAR PV PROJECT
FINANCING REGULATORY AND LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGES FOR THIRD-PARTY PPA SYSTEM
OWNERS (2010) (giving an overview of the competing models for third-party financing of
solar systems).
211

372

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

The limited number of economic beneficiaries stands in stark contrast to the
allocation of program costs across all ratepayers. The extra costs incurred by a utility
to procure the RECs necessary to comply with the standard’s sourcing requirement
are usually folded into its retail electricity rates thereby spreading the financial
burden across all ratepayers pro rata of their power consumption.218 A cost
allocation that so closely correlates the financing of a clean energy policy with the
consumption of energy and, hence, the environmental and other social costs of its
generation might warrant top marks in terms of environmental equity. For purposes
of the present inquiry into a policy’s economic equity, however, the mismatch
between the quasi-socialization of costs and the limited availability of economic
opportunities created by renewable portfolio standards prevents a higher than
moderate rating.
Renewable portfolio standards receive excellent marks regarding indirect costs
and benefits thanks to the planning stability they afford to grid operators and to the
priming effect they have in preparing constituents for cap-and-trade policies as an
economy-wide approach to greenhouse gas emission reductions. With their market
reliance for pricing and remuneration, portfolio standards do not require dispatch
priority and, hence, need not impose negative externalities on other generators. At
the same time, they deliver similar merit-order benefits to wholesale markets as the
above policies. When policymakers adopt renewable portfolio standards mandating
that a certain percentage of retail electricity sales come from renewables, they create
demand and, hence, a market for renewable power and, at the same time, limit the
size of that market.219 As deployed capacity and projects already underway approach
the mandated demand target, developers looking to benefit from the policy’s
financial incentives will be wary to launch new projects.220
Under a feed-in tariff or similar price-based policy, the volume and pace of
renewable energy deployment depend on the interplay between policy remuneration,
hardware costs, installation costs, and other factors subject to changing market
conditions. If costs come down faster than anticipated, a level of policy remuneration
that was reasonable at the outset may become overly generous leading to greaterthan-expected deployment. Germany experienced such an overheating in its solar
market during the early 2010s when the country’s feed-in tariff rates failed to adjust
to rapidly declining prices for solar panels.221 The resulting surge in solar
deployment created enormous challenges for grid management and operations.222
With their simultaneous creation and limitation of clean energy markets, renewable
218

See Davies, supra note 109, at 1363–64.
See Mormann, Investor Appeal of Renewable Energy, supra note 16, at 712
(discussing the cap inherent in the sourcing requirements set by renewable portfolio
standards).
220
See Michael Mendelsohn, Does RPS Still Gun the Engines, RENEWABLE ENERGY
PROJECT FIN. (Nov. 7, 2012, 10:00 AM), https://financere.nrel.gov/finance/content/does-rpsstill-gun-engines [https://perma.cc/Z2HG-YCKK] (questioning the capacity of state RPS
programs to drive deployment as achievement of the RPS target draws nearer).
221
See Mormann et al., supra note 8, at 97.
222
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
219
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portfolio standards enable network operators to anticipate growth in order to ensure
the grid’s ability to absorb a growing share of intermittent renewable power
generators. This planning certainty is all the more pronounced when the sourcing
requirement ramps up gradually over a period of several years, as is the case under
most renewable portfolio standards in the United States.223
The second driver behind the excellent rating of portfolio standards in terms of
indirect costs and benefits is their educational impact setting the stage for future
implementation of cap-and-trade policies to promote greenhouse gas emission
reductions. Recent research suggests that green industrial policies like feed-in tariffs
and renewable portfolio standards fuel progress toward more comprehensive climate
policies, such as a tax on carbon or a cap-and-trade regime.224 This enabling effect
of green industrial policies is attributed to their moving economic constituents into
coalitions for decarbonization and creating positive feedback loops.225 The same
rationale would apply to all clean energy support policies discussed in this Part and,
therefore, would not warrant special recognition of the renewable portfolio standard.
The latter, however, goes above and beyond the previously discussed policies
insofar as its market reliance helps familiarize key stakeholders—from regulators to
utilities to generators—with the trading dynamics that are crucial to a successful
cap-and-trade regime, one of the policies economists consider most promising to
decarbonize the energy economy and mitigate global climate change.226
F. Summary and Suggestions for Reform
The preceding inquiry into the policy equity of the leading policies in place to
promote clean energy technologies today offers but a snapshot of the broader,
increasingly diverse policy landscape. The limited sample size of one case study per
policy and the need to distinguish between conceptual and implementation issues
caution against drawing overly general conclusions. Accordingly, this Section
expressly focuses on the respective policy as implemented in the studied jurisdiction.
To the extent that other jurisdictions have followed a similar implementation route
for the same policy, however, some of the following observations and suggestions
for reform may translate to these jurisdictions. Table 2 summarizes the policy equity
ratings for the studied policies and jurisdictions.
223
See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.30(c)(2) (West 2017) (laying out the rampup schedule for California’s renewable portfolio standard, from 25% by the end of 2016 to
33% by 2020, 44% by 2024, 52% by 2027, and 60% by 2030).
224
See Jonas Meckling et al., Winning Coalitions for Climate Policy: Green Industrial
Policy Builds Support for Carbon Regulation, 349 SCI. 1170, 1170 (2015).
225
Id.; see also Eric Biber, Cultivating a Green Political Landscape: Lessons for
Climate Change Policy from the Defeat of California’s Proposition 23, 66 VAND. L. REV.
399, 426 (2013) (“The first priority in climate change policy should be to increase the
economic and political support for future climate legislation by building the industry that has
a political and economic stake in expanding climate legislation.”).
226
See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address
Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 296–97 (2008).
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POLICY EQUITY RATING
Direct
Indirect
Moderate
Moderate

TENDER REGIMES
(IRELAND)

Moderate

Poor

NET METERING
(UNITED STATES)

Poor

Good

TAX CREDITS
(UNITED STATES)

Poor

Poor

PORTFOLIO STANDARDS
(UNITED STATES)

Moderate

Excellent

Table 2: Policy Equity Ratings for Case Studies

Feed-in tariffs, as implemented in Germany, display moderate overall policy
equity with points scored for relatively widespread access to the policy’s direct
economic benefits but points deducted for the German policymaker’s decision to
exempt nearly 2,000 of the country’s most energy-intensive firms from bearing
direct program costs. Two tweaks would go a long way toward improving direct
policy equity. First, industrial ratepayers should be required to contribute their share
to the levy imposed to finance feed-in tariff payments. Concerns over international
competitiveness could be addressed through increased self-generation for on-site
consumption thereby lowering an industrial firm’s overall consumption of gridprovided electricity and, hence, its obligations under the feed-in tariff levy. Second,
the German feed-in tariff could be amended to enable greater participation by
ratepayers who do not own real property, for example through community-level
projects such as those championed by wind cooperatives in Denmark.227 Indirect
policy equity of Germany’s commitment to low-carbon renewables suffers primarily
due to the externalization of balancing efforts and costs by renewable power
generators exempt from the grid’s usual forecasting and balancing requirements.
Acceleration of the ongoing shift toward greater forecast and balancing the
responsibility of solar, wind, and other intermittent generators would go a long way
toward relieving the burden on other generators and improving indirect policy
equity.
227

See H. C. SOERSENSEN ET AL., INT’L SOC’Y OF OFFSHORE AND POLAR ENGINEERS,
MIDDELGRUNDEN 40 MW OFFSHORE WIND FARM, A PRESTUDY FOR THE DANISH OFFSHORE
750 MW WIND PROGRAM 1 (2000), http://www.middelgrunden.dk/middelgrunden/sites/
default/files/public/file/Middelgrunden%2040%20MW%20offshore%20wind%20farm%20
prestudy.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP7K-SDML] (reporting that, by 2001, more than 100,000
Danish families were part of wind cooperatives that accounted for 80 percent of the country’s
wind turbines).
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Ireland’s tender regime offers moderate direct policy equity but performs
poorly in terms of indirect policy equity. On the positive side, Ireland allocates direct
costs across all ratepayers without exemptions and uses technology-specific auctions
to create economic opportunities for a greater range of projects. A higher rating is
prevented, however, by the auction process’s complexity, lack of transparency, and
limited planning certainty for potential bidders, restricting the program’s ability to
mobilize a greater pool of participants in the tender rounds. Improvements to the
auction process would help raise both direct and indirect policy equity while
converting the tender regime’s surcharge from a flat rate fee to a levy that allocates
costs pro rata a ratepayer’s electricity consumption would positively impact direct
policy equity.
The prevailing model of state net metering policies offers good indirect policy
equity but delivers poor direct policy equity. From enhanced resiliency to congestion
relief and peak shaving, net metering provides a host of indirect benefits to the
electric grid and its stakeholders. These benefits come at the cost of grid upgrades
and higher fees for fast-ramping back-up power, among others. In the end, both the
indirect costs and benefits associated with net metering tend to accrue primarily at
the ratepayer level, delivering good indirect policy equity. The same, unfortunately,
cannot be said of the match between net metering’s direct costs and benefits.
Economic opportunities are relatively accessible, at least for homeowners, but
access could be significantly expanded through more widespread adoption of
community-solar and virtual net metering programs.228 They are financed, in large
part, through cost shifting from net metering ratepayers to their non-net metering
counterparts, raising serious equity concerns. These cost shifts are by no means an
ineluctable by-product of net metering, however. A simple tweak to utility ratesetting and billing practices would go a long way toward improving the policy equity
of net metering. Once the fixed charges currently folded into volumetric retail rates
are billed separately and thus decoupled from a ratepayer’s consumption,
remuneration of net metering customers at retail rates will entail significantly less
cost shifting among different groups of ratepayers. Conversely, better understanding
and quantification of the time- and location-variant system benefits produced by
distributed generation would allow to adjust the overall compensation for net
metering customers where appropriate.
Federal tax credits receive a poor overall policy equity rating due to the gross
mismatch between the oligopolization of direct economic benefits among a small
group of high-income tax investors and the quasi-socialization of direct program
costs across American taxpayers. Indirect policy equity is hurt by wholesale market
distortions resulting from the need for negative price signals to discourage wind
228

A growing number of states are adopting policies to require community-solar virtual
net metering programs where ratepayers use off-site solar generation to reduce their
electricity bills. See, e.g., Gabriel Chan et al., Design Choices and Equity Implications of
Community Shared Solar, 30 ELECRICITY J. 37, 37, 40 (2017) (discussing programs in fifteen
states and the District of Columbia, noting that the “normative goal to increase access to
solar energy for those without an adequate roof or finances” is at the heart of communitysolar programs).
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generators from feeding surplus power into the grid during times of low demand.
The latter distortion could be remedied by replacing the production tax credit regime
for wind power with the kind of investment tax credit that has proven to be an
effective driver of solar deployment.229 Overall policy equity of either type of tax
credit would further be improved significantly if tax credits for renewable energy
were made refundable thereby obviating the need for costly tax investment
structures to monetize these credits in a timely fashion.230
The prevailing model of state-level renewable portfolio standards receives
excellent marks for its indirect policy equity thanks to the planning stability that
these programs offer to grid operators and their role as primers for a future cap-andtrade regime to regulate economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions. Direct policy
equity, meanwhile, is no more than moderate due to revenue uncertainty and
transaction costs that restrict access to the policy’s economic benefits. These barriers
to access will be difficult to eliminate altogether without sacrificing the market
reliance that defines renewable portfolio standards. They could, however, be
mitigated through better coordination among state policymakers toward a unified
market for RECs resulting in greater liquidity and lower price volatility.231 Another
option would be the joint implementation of renewable portfolio standards and feedin tariffs to simultaneously reduce both investor and regulatory risk thereby
promoting more widespread participation in these policies.232
IV. POLYCENTRICITY AS A CATALYST FOR GREATER POLICY EQUITY
Assessing and, more importantly, improving policy equity requires a deep
understanding of the flow of costs and benefits—direct and indirect—generated by
clean energy policy. Direction and magnitude of these flows will depend on program
specifics as well as the investment needs and abilities of stakeholders. As a first step
toward more equitable clean energy policy, the process of policymaking, from
design to adoption to implementation, should become more inclusive.
The polycentric approach to governance championed by Professors Elinor and
Vincent Ostrom offers a promising path forward. For the Ostroms and their
colleagues, polycentricity connotes multiple centers of decisionmaking that are
formally independent of each other but may, in practice, interact through
competitive relationships, collaborative endeavors, and otherwise function in a
229

See, e.g., SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, SOLAR ITC IMPACT ANALYSIS,
https://www.seia.org/sites/default/files/ITC%20Impact%20Analysis%20Factsheet_Sep201
5.pdf [https://perma.cc/VKM7-GZ5M].
230
The tax code has long recognized refundable tax credits such as the Child Tax Credit
under 26 U.S.C. § 24 (2018) or the Earned Income Tax Credit under 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2018).
231
See Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, supra note 14, at 1644 (discussing the
benefits of a unified REC trading market).
232
See Felix Mormann, Re-Allocating Risk: The Case for Closer Integration of Priceand Quantity-Based Support Policies for Clean Energy, 27 ELECTRICITY J. 9, 15 (2014)
(proposing a model for greater integration of feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio standards
toward better mitigation and allocation of investor and regulatory risk).
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coherent manner.233 Late in her career, Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom advocated for
a more polycentric approach to climate governance.234 According to Ostrom,
polycentricity tends to “enhance innovation, learning, adaptation, trustworthiness,
levels of cooperation of participants, and the achievement of more effective,
equitable, and sustainable outcomes at multiple scales.”235
Compared to traditional, monocentric governance models, polycentric
decisionmaking offers two chief advantages of relevance to climate and clean energy
policy.236 First, polycentric approaches provide greater opportunities for
experimentation and learning to improve policies over time. Second, they increase
communications and interactions among parties facilitating the exchange of critical
information while building the mutual trust necessary for better cooperation.
Clean energy policymaking in the United States already leverages many of the
benefits flowing from policy experimentation and learning across jurisdictions and
institutions. In the absence of a comprehensive federal policy approach to clean
energy, states and municipalities have stepped up to fill the policy void, breathing
life into the Brandeisian vision of states as laboratories of democracy.237 The
resulting policy potpourri showcases an impressive diversity, running the gamut
from top-down regulatory mandates to market-based approaches, with ample
evidence of inter-jurisdictional policy learning.238 Intra-jurisdictional
communication, learning, and cooperation among institutions and stakeholders,
however, continues to lag.
Over a quarter-century ago, Professor Richard Lazarus effectively jumpstarted
the legal literature on environmental justice when he lamented the lack of
participatory processes in environmental policymaking and called for more
widespread access to relevant decisionmaking fora.239 Shortly after, Professor Alice
Kaswan noted the widespread perception of environmental law as a “significant
233
See Vincent Ostrom, et al., The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas:
A Theoretical Inquiry, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 831, 831–32 (1961); see also Elinor Ostrom,
Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems, 100
AM. ECON. REV. 641 (2010) (tracing the genesis and evolution of the polycentric governance
approach).
234
See Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change 32–39
(The World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 5095, 2009).
235
Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global
Environmental Change, 20 GLOB. ENVTL. CHANGE 550, 552 (2010).
236
See Daniel H. Cole, Advantages of a Polycentric Approach to Climate Change
Policy, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 114, 114 (2015).
237
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
238
See, e.g., Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, supra note 14, at 344 (describing the
“panoply of federal and state renewable energy policies”).
239
See Lazarus, supra note 52, at 850 (urging that serious consideration should be given
to reforming the structure of environmental policymaking so as to enhance access to relevant
decisionmaking fora). Beyond the community of legal scholars, Robert Bullard is generally
credited as the father of the environmental justice movement. See, e.g., Robert D. Bullard,
Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community, 53 SOC. INQUIRY 273 (1983).
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cause of disproportionate burdens.”240 This Article’s equity inquiry suggests that
today’s clean energy policies create similarly pervasive distributional distortions,
likely due, at least in part, to deficits in participation and transparency. While
environmental lawmakers are increasingly seeking input from a wide range of
stakeholders,241 policymakers and regulators rarely manage to muster the same level
of engagement with the public in the context of energy-related decisionmaking.242
In a forthcoming article, Professors Shelley Welton and Joel Eisen offer empirical
evidence suggesting that more widespread public participation in clean energy
policymaking is prevented by “byzantine decision-making processes” as well as the
“particularly technical” nature of the issues involved.243
As the electric grid and other aspects of the energy economy become more
interactive,244 so, too, should the policy landscape that supports these developments
become more participatory. With climate change a key driver of the clean energy
transition, Ostrom’s pitch for more polycentric governance in climate issues readily
translates to clean energy governance. In a recent study of climate and energy
programs in Bangladesh, Brazil, China, and Denmark, Professor Benjamin Sovacool
found that “polycentric approaches to climate and energy governance can offer an
equitable, inclusive, informative, accountable, protective, and adaptable framework
for promoting renewable energy.”245

240
Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental
Laws and Justice, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 223 (1997).
241
See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Environmental Justice in an Era of Devolved Collaboration,
26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 459, 460 (2002) (noting increasing participation by local
collaborative groups, or “devolved collaboration,” in environmental decisionmaking);
Kaswan, supra note 240, at 226–27 (describing the Environmental Protection Agency’s
establishment of the Environmental Equity Workgroup and similar efforts to ensure more
widespread participation in environmental lawmaking).
242
Energy regulation is often likened to a black box. See, e.g., Klaus Heine, Inside the
Black Box: Incentive Regulation and Incentive Channeling on Energy Markets, 17 J. MGMT.
& GOVERNANCE 157, 158 (2013); KEN BANISTER, NAVIGATING THE BLACK BOX OF ENERGY
REGULATION: A PEEK INSIDE THE ALBERTA ENERGY REGULATOR 1, http://kbanister.com/dl/
Black_Box.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BYF-BJG2]. For an illustrative example of the
widespread practice of using “black-box settlements” to resolve disputes over the rates for
energy services and products, see, e.g., City of Osceola v. Entergy Arkansas, Inc., 154
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61099, 2016 WL 682824, at *5 (F.E.R.C. Feb. 18, 2016).
243
Welton & Eisen, supra note 17, at 40.
244
See, e.g., Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 17, at 583 (“[S]tates are more
directly mediating the relationship between consumers and electricity, seeking to prompt
more active grid participation on the part of consumers.”).
245
Sovacool, supra note 18, at 3842.
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Building on these insights, policymakers should solicit more widespread
feedback and participation at the design and implementation stages of the next
generation of clean energy policies. A better understanding of diverse and often
competing stakeholder interests will allow for more accurate mapping of the
anticipated flows of costs and benefits under a policy. Close monitoring of actual
policy impacts and iterative learning through regular stakeholder participation as
well as information exchange among policymakers can help fine-tune policies over
time.
To be clear, participation is no panacea. More widespread stakeholder
involvement in the energy policymaking process poses its own challenges. If the
impact of participatory policymaking is to extend beyond mere lip service,
institutional frameworks must allow for consideration and incorporation of
stakeholder input into the actual decisionmaking process. The latter, however, may
require significant time and resources. The rulemaking process for federal agencies
under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)246 aptly illustrates this point. In
developing the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan,247 the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) received well over four million comments on its proposed
rule.248 The scale of this unprecedented input from states, tribes, utilities, and other
stakeholders is all the more remarkable considering that EPA followed the APA’s—
theoretically, at least—more streamlined track of notice-and-comment
rulemaking.249
Not every institution tasked with energy-related policymaking and regulation
has the resources required to sift through millions of pages of comments or conduct
weeks of hearings. This is especially true of institutions at the state, municipal, and
other subnational levels—the primary fora for clean energy policymaking in recent
years.250 Any attempts at reform to render decisionmaking processes more
democratic should, therefore, be careful not to let widespread participation
overwhelm and, ultimately, paralyze the policymaker or regulator in question. Along
the way, participatory policymaking may have to move beyond hearings, comments,
and other traditional methods of soliciting input from the general public. Recent
scholarship, for example, suggests prediction markets as a means of aggregating and

246

5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. (2018).
See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64, 662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60) [hereinafter Clean Power Plan].
248
Id. at 64, 663 (pegging the overall number of comments received at 4.3 million).
249
See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
250
For an overview of state and municipal policy activism in climate and clean energy,
see, e.g., Mormann, State Climate Policy Innovation, supra note 111, at 190–91; Kirsten H.
Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives and State and Local Climate Change Initiatives,
2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 119, 123 (2008); Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism,
and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 883 (2008); Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities
as Actors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV.
681, 683 (2008).
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evaluating widely dispersed information and expertise in a manner that is both timeand cost-effective.251
Even with these challenges and caveats in mind, the potential to anticipate and
mitigate, if not altogether avoid, the equity deficits observed under today’s batch of
clean energy policies suggests that the benefits of more participatory policymaking
far outweigh the associated costs. Moreover, participatory decisionmaking processes
have the potential to build greater popular support for climate and clean energy
policy. The literature has long lamented democratic deficits in the regulatory
process, suggesting that new laws and policies would meet with greater public
approval if constituents feel that their voice has, or at least could have, been heard.252
Greater transparency of the anticipated flows of costs and benefits, meanwhile,
makes it harder for politicians to highjack clean energy policy as a vehicle for doling
out favors to special interests thereby reducing the risk of pork-barreling practices
that have long marred energy policymaking.253
As the clean energy transition transforms the global energy economy, its
repercussions are felt across all sectors of society. Decarbonization, therefore,
cannot proceed successfully without regard for the equity implications of its
enabling policy landscape. To date, clean energy policymaking primarily follows a
monocentric, top-down approach with limited opportunity, let alone a sophisticated
process, for soliciting and considering stakeholder input. A polycentric approach to
clean energy governance has the potential to accelerate the clean energy transition
through more effective, better-informed policymaking, while building greater
popular support for a key component of global efforts to mitigate anthropogenic
climate change.254
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See Gary Lucas, Jr. & Felix Mormann, Betting on Climate Policy: Using Prediction
Markets to Address Global Warming, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1429 (2019) (exploring the
potential for prediction markets to inform the design and implementation of net energy
metering programs, feed-in tariffs, and renewable portfolio standards, among other clean
energy policies).
252
See, e.g., David Arkush, Democracy and Administrative Legitimacy, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 611, 611–12 (2012) (“[T]he administrative process is often inaccessible to
the public . . . and the public lacks tools to assess adequately the quality of regulatory policies
and outcomes.”); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic
State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1512 (1992) (arguing that “the political theory of civic
republicanism, with its emphasis on citizen participation in government and deliberative
decision-making, provides the best justification for the American bureaucracy”); Paul
Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 YALE L.
J. 1623, 1624 (1988) (suggesting that “participatory citizenship is good in itself”).
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254
For persuasive evidence of the need to accelerate the clean energy transition, see,
e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policy Makers, in GLOBAL
WARMING OF 1.5°C (2018) (noting that limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius will
deliver clear benefits to people and natural ecosystems but requires rapid and far-reaching
policy action).
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CONCLUSION
Policymakers and scholars have historically assessed the performance of clean
energy policies through an efficacy-oriented lens and, more recently, through an
efficiency-oriented lens. This Article has made the case for adding equity as another
first-order consideration in the design, implementation, and assessment of policies
to promote the transition to a clean and decarbonized energy economy. Properly
defined as the commensurate distribution of costs and benefits, the concept of equity
offers a more reliable metric than the competing, normatively charged notions of
fairness that dominate the public discourse today. Doctrinally, equity is no stranger
to energy law but, rather, deeply rooted in rate design and other staples of public
utility law.
For a task as Herculean in scope as the clean energy transition, where timelines
are measured in decades and capital requirements in trillions of dollars, it is
important to consider not only the equity of the end goal of decarbonization. Rather,
any inquiry should logically begin with the distribution of costs and benefits that
policies create along the way. Accordingly, this Article calls on policymakers and
scholars to include both the equity of the desired outcome and the equity of the
enabling policy landscape as they craft the next generation of clean energy policies.
Application of this metric to a sampling of representative case studies reveals
significant differences in the policy equity of today’s leading clean energy policies.
While the present sampling offers but a snapshot of the broader policy landscape,
the universally observed room for improvement suggests a systemic
underappreciation of the importance of policy equity.
Going forward, this Article proposes the polycentric governance model
championed by Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom as a catalyst for more equitable clean
energy policies. As the clean energy transition continues to make the electric grid
ever more interactive, the process of policymaking itself must also become more
participatory. A polycentric approach provides significantly more opportunities for
experimentation and learning while increasing communication among parties to
facilitate greater exchange of critical information and build the trust necessary to
inspire more widespread participation and collaboration.

